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DOCTRINE AND THE "GORDIAN KNOT"
SYNDROME
Joseph H. King, Jr.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Polish poet and philosopher, Zbigniew Herbert, has written a
spirited essay decrying the misplaced lessons often derived from the
euhemerism of The Gordian Knzot.' The setting, according to Herbert's
apocryphal rendition, 2 finds Alexander the Great in Gordian in Asia
Minor, awaiting replacements from Greece for his uncertain campaign
against the Persians.3 His soothsayer, Aristander, advised Alexander that
it was time for a heroic awe-inspiring gesture to assure the troops that
the coming slaughter was divinely inspired Aristander settled on the
war chariot of the legendary monarch of Thrace, King Midas, and more
particularly upon the insoluble knot fastened to the chariot's shaft.!
Aristander declared a prophecy: "He who unties the Gordian Knot vil

* UTK Distinguished Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. J.D., Unihersity
of Pennsylvania. Research for this Article was supported by a generous research grant from tha
College. My research assistant, C. Lee Bussart, ably assisted me vith
locating case references for
this Article.
1. Zbigniew Herbert, The Gordian Knot, KEN ON REV., Summer 1934. at 34 (John
Carpenter & Bogdana Carpenter trans.).
2. See id. at 34.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 35.
5. Id.
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become the Master of Greece." 6 Trouble was, of course, that the knot

mocked Alexander's efforts to untie it.' "And then it happened.
Alexander drew his sword and sliced the knot in half with a single
stroke."'
The "Gordian knot" entered the metaphorical treasury as a symbol
of "[a] cunning strategem, intellectual courage, the lightning-swift

transformation of idea into action, or the supremacy of spirit over
matter."9 Not so fast, says Herbert:
Inconceivable blindness caused [Alexander] to introduce an element of
force into the process of thinking. How could he overlook the fact that
the untying of knots and problems is not an athletic display but an
intellectual process, and this assumes trial and error, helplessness in
the face of the tangled material of the world, wonderful human
uncertainty, and humble patience. 0
Defendants in defamation cases have sometimes argued that the

reputation of a plaintiff has already become so sullied that the plaintiff is
"libel proof,"'1 or that the "incremental harm" caused by the defamatory
statement was only minimal when compared to the nonactionable

portions of the publication.' 2 Under either gambit, defendants urge that
the trial judge dismiss the plaintiffs defamation claim. What does the
"Gordian knot" have to do with these doctrines? The libel-proof plaintiff

and incremental harm doctrines represent, I believe, just the kind of
simplistic expedients that Herbert condemns in his essay. Rather than
undertake the painful process of working through the core elements,
potential privileges, and damages rules that govern defamation claims,
some courts and commentators have increasingly turned to the facile
libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines as comfortable
6. Id. (capitalization omitted).
7. See id. at 36.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 38. On a more basic level, the "Gordian knot" (as compared to its solution) has
come to represent a symbol for complex problems. For a sampling of such use of the term in the
legal context, see, State v. Kinchen, 707 A.2d 1255, 1264 (Conn. 1998) (referring to ."Gordian
knot-like problem[s].') (quoting State v. Corehado, 512 A.2d 183, 189 (Conn. 1986)); 1 ROBERT D.
SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 10.1, at 10-1 (3d ed.
2000) (discussing damages issues in defamation law and saying "the knots are Gordian").
10. Herbert, supra note 1, at 39.
11. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 299 (2d Cir. 1986)
("Guccione's claim fails as a matter of law ... because Guccione was 'libel-proof' with respect to
an accusation of adultery.").
12. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227-29 (7th Cir. 1993)
("[F]alsehoods which do no incremental damage to the plaintiff's reputation do not injure the only
interest that the law of defamation protects.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss2/1

2

King: The Misbegotten Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine and the "Gordian K
20001

THE "GORDIAN KNOT" SYNDROME

expedients for bypassing established elemental principles of defamation
law. And, more ominously, these classificatory doctrines neatly mask
and serve to avoid the difficult societal conditions from which so-called
libel-proof members of society came.
In the sections that follow I will briefly examine the problematic
underpinnings of the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm
doctrines. My purpose here is not to comprehensively survey the case
law nationally or of any particular state. Thus, I will not attempt to retrace case-by-case the convoluted paths of all of the cases. I will then
review some of the manifold arguments that have been advanced in
support of the doctrines, as well as various critical appraisals of the
doctrines. I will next explain my thesis that the doctrines be eliminated
from the defamation nomenclature.
My opposition to the libel-proof and incremental harm doctrines, as
discrete defenses to defamation claims, should not be interpreted as a
lack of sympathy for the goals commonly associated with the doctrines.
Those goals, including the conservation of judicial resources and
enhancing freedom of press and expression, 3 have their place and I
support them in principle. It is not the aims of the libel-proof plaintiff
and incremental harm doctrines to which I object. Rather, it is the use of
the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines by the courts to
attempt to achieve their goals.
I object to the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines
for two reasons. First, on an instrumental level, I oppose the doctrines
because they bypass the recognized elements, damages rules, and
privileges-defenses of defamation law, or at least operate independently
of those established elemental principles. Far from rationalizing and
streamlining the litigation process, I believe the doctrines add
uncertainty and complexity to an area already overburdened with
common law artifacts and modem complex constitutional overlays.
Many cases ostensibly relying on the libel-proof plaintiff or incremental
harm doctrines can be (and often, through an alternative holding, have
been) better explained and rationalized on the basis of the recognized
elements and privileges, without the need to invoke the libel-proof or
incremental-harm lingo. The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm
doctrines, by providing easy hooks with which the courts may kill a
defamation case, preempt thoughtful analysis of the underlying issues of
the nature of reputational harm, the effect of the plaintiff's preexisting

13. See Evelyn A. Peyton, Comment, Rogues' Rights: The Constitutienality ef the Libe.Preaf
PlaintiffDoctrine,34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 179,208.09 (1993).
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reputation on his claim, and the operation of causation and other
elements. The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines do
little more than jostle and obfuscate the elements of defamation law. I
contend that defamation claims should be determined exclusively within
the framework of the elements, damages rules, and privileges-defenses
of defamation law. If those foundational components are in need of
change, then that process should occur directly and thoughtfully, rather
than obliquely through doctrinal expedients.
Secondly, on a different level, the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and
to some extent the incremental harm doctrine are based on faulty
premises. Moreover, the effects of this specious reasoning are
compounded by the way the doctrines operate. The doctrines depend on
a view of an individual's nature and reputation that is static rather than
dynamic. They are also premised on a view of reputation that is
monolithic rather than multifaceted. These premises are then applied in
doctrines that operate in a binary and classificatory manner. Some
plaintiffs are deemed to fall into a defamation untermenschen 4 and are
precluded from proceeding with their claims. Others are allowed to
pursue theirs. The classificatory approach here is emblematic of a
broader tendency to use "unworthiness" classifications as easy (and
perhaps disingenuous) solvents for complex social problems, masking
and thereby avoiding the felt need to address underlying causes.
Classifying persons as libel-proof, or criminals, or unworthy poor, neatly
resects their plight from the legal vista. These "Gordian knots" are
cavalierly severed. But, like the brooms of the Sorcerer's Apprentice, '
other knots will quickly take their place. And, we are no closer to real
solutions for untying the gnarled twisted knots that have ensnared so
many poor and imprisoned persons for so long. The doctrines also place
our judges in a position they have usually assiduously avoided-that of
deciding who is and who is not characteristically worthy of legal respect
and protection from defamatory attack.
Hopefully, it is not too late to get these misbegotten genies back
into their bottle. I realize that without the libel-proof plaintiff and
incremental harm doctrinal expedients, the courts and counsel will have
to wade into the elemental thickets that have ensnared many an unwary
analyst. I also acknowledge that the scope of this Article leaves many,
14. "Untermensehen is the German word for inferior peoples," also known as "groups beyond
normal human concern," and was applied by the Nazis to "non-Aryan people in Europe." Joan
Vogel, Biological Theories of Human Behavior: Admonitions of a Skeptic, 22 VT. L. REV. 425, 432
& n.36 (1997).
15. See SToRMs FROM WALT DIsNEY's FANTASIA (1940).
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perhaps most, of the questions of elemental law reform of defamation
law to others or another day. One step at a time is acceptable here. As J.
R. Lucas admonished, "the best is the enemy of the possible."' 6
H.

ELUSIVE UNDERPINNINGS

A.

Origins

Defamation is the tort theory that provides a civil remedy for
communications that harm a victim's reputation. The required elements
for a defamation claim are: (a) a statement or communication; (b) a
defamatory meaning;"7 (c) publication; 8 (d) reference to the plaintiff,"

(e) causal connection between the defamatory statement and the harm to
the plaintiffs reputation;O" (f) liability-supporting state of mind of the

defendant with respect to the truth or falsity of the statement (at least on
matters of public concern);' (g) special damages when required (in some
jurisdictions);'2 (h) falsity; -' and (i) a statement of fact or one implying
16. J. R. LUCAS, THE FUTURE ANESSAY ON GOD, TEMPORALITY ANDTRUTH ix (1939).

17. See l SACK, supranote 9, § 2.4.1, at 2-8. A statement "is defamatory if it tends so to harm
the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him." RESTATF-NENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
18. "Publication" is a term of art that means that the allegedly defamatory statement was
communicated to at least one person (recipient) other than or in addition to the plaintiff. See Ball v.
White, 143 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Mich. CL App. 1966).
19. See RESTATEMw-NT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 564; 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LA%, OF
DEFAMATION § 4:39, at 4-61 (2d ed. 2000); Joseph H. King, Jr., Reference to the Plaintiff
Requirement in Defamatory Statements Directed at Groups, 35 WAKE FOREST L REV. 343, 345

(2000).
20. See RESTATF-MNT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 575, 622A cmt b; 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS
LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.2(7), at 279, § 7.2(9), at 284 (2d ed. 1993) (referring to the requirement of
"show[ing] that defamation is a but-for cause of reputational harm"); I SACK, supra note 9.
§ 10.5.3, at 10-44. This element is especially complex in defamation law. For example, to the extent
that a plaintiff may, under applicable state and federal constitutional law, be entitled to presumed
damages,the causal connection may, at least in some respects, be deemed established mrely from
the nature of the statement. In such circumstances and to that extent, the need for direct proof of
causation may largely be obviated. The causation element is discussed later in Part uI.B.2. See infra
notes 190-269 and accompanying text.
21. See I SACK, supranote 9, § 2.1.3, at 24, § 2.2, at 2-5. The requirement of proof of "fault"
is constitutionally mandated, at least for statements involving matters of public concern. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,751,763 (1985); GCrtz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323,347 (1974).
22. See ROBERTD. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
§ 2.1.4, at 66, § 8.3.2, at 488 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998). Special damages, for the purposes of this
element, consist of something having pecuniary value. They must result from the reaction of
recipients of the defamatory communication. Under the traditional rule, the fact that the plaintiff
suffers emotional distress is alone not enough to satisfy this clement, when required. See
RESTATFMNT (SEcoND) OFTORTS § 575 cmt b.
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"undisclosed defamatory facts" (rather than "pure" opinion) 4 Moreover,
even when all of the elements are established, recovery may be

constitutionally limited to actual damages for matters of public concern,
at least in the absence of proof of knowledge or reckless disregard."

Every potential defamation plaintiff brings with him or her a certain
amount of reputational baggage that preexisted the publication of the
alleged defamation. In addition to potentially mitigating damages,"
sometimes a plaintiff's preexisting reputation is deemed to have a more
definitive effect on reputation. The idea that a plaintiffs reputation has

already become sufficiently besmirched (at least on some matters) so
that he or she should not be permitted to proceed further with a

defamation claim has produced two doctrines. The first, which I will
refer to here as the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine,27 has an open-universe
23. See 1 SACK, supra note 9, § 2.1.1, at 2-3; infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the burden of proof
on the truth or falsity issue). The requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defamatory statement
was false is constitutionally mandated, at least with respect to statements involving matters of public
concern. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 565-566. Proof that the statement is "provably
false" is also constitutionally required, at least with respect to statements involving matters of public
concern. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).
25. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 755; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349; DAN B. DOBaS, T1Iu
LAW OFTORTS § 417, at 1169 (2000).
26. See infra notes 230-41 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 7.2(9), at 286; C. Robert Gage Jr. & Christopher P.
Conniff, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 23, 1994, at 1; Kevin L. Kite, Note,
Incremental Identities: Libel-Proof Plaintiffs, Substantial Truth, and the Future of the Incremental
Harm Doctrine, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 530 (1998); Eliot J. Katz, Annotation, Defamation: Who Is
"Libel-Proof," 50 A.L.R. 4th 1257, 1259 (1986 & Supp. 2000). This doctrine is sometimes referred
to as the "issue-specific" application or branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, a tendency begun
by an influential law review note. See Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1909, 1910-12 (1985); see also James A. Hemphill, Note, Libel-Proof Plaintiffs and the Question of
Injury, 71 TEX. L. REV. 401, 405-06 (1992); David Marder, Note, Libel Proof Plaiztiffs-Rabble
Without a Cause, 67 B.U. L. REV. 993, 999-1003 (1987). Hemphill notes that "[tihe term 'issuespecific' acknowledges that a libel suit necessarily involves the plaintiff's reputation regarding a
specific issue." Hemphill, supra, at 406. But that terminology is confusing since both the libel-proof
plaintiff and the incremental harm doctrines are most commonly limited in their application to prior
reputational factors that relate to the same issue (thus, issue-specific) as in the alleged defamation.
See Note, supra, at 1910-11. In fact, if anything, the incremental harm branch is probably more
issue-specific than the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, since it essentially depends on the extent of the
overlapping of the impact from the actionable and nonactionable portions of the publication.
Whereas, the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine may occasionally be applied broadly to situations in
which the plaintiffs prior reputation and the alleged defamation may not be similar or issuespecific. See Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618, 622 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (applying Tennessee law
in barring a claim by the convicted assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in which he alleged that
he was libeled by a statement referring to "him as a 'narcotics addict and peddler' and.., robber"
because the court found him to be libel-proof as a habitual criminal) (quoting the alleged libelous
Time magazine article), af'd, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1978); 2 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 7.2(9), at
288-89 (indicating some disagreement among authorities as to whether the doctrine should apply in
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perspective in that it considers the entire reputational trail of the plaintiff
that predated the defendant's publication. This rule holds that in some
circumstances the prior reputation of the plaintiff has already become so

tarnished that, with respect to the imputation in the defendant's
statement, the plaintiff is libel-proof, and therefore a court should

dismiss or at least ultimately deny his defamation claim.1 The origins of
this Gothic doctrine are usually traced to the Second Circuit case of
Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc." A book entitled My Life in the
Mafdo suggested that the plaintiff had "tak[en] part in various criminal

enterprises."'" But the plaintiff denied participating in a robbery
mentioned, fixing a race (for which he was indicted but not tried), and

a situation that did not involve a defamatory statement that was simply "'more of the same'"I
(quoting a hypothetical response); Stephen Weaver, Case Note, Analyzing the Limits of the LibelProofPlaintiffDoctrine-Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time, Inc., 62 TE.MP. L REv. 405. 415
(1989).
28. For background on the doctrine, see 2 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 7.29). at 286-90
(referring to the doctrine under which "the plaintiff's prior reputation may lead the court to bar his
claim altogether"); I SACK, supra note 9, § 2.4.18, at 2-63 (stating that the "doctrine hold[s] that a
notorious person is without a 'good name' and therefore may not recover for injury to it"); Gage Jr.
& Conniff, supra note 27 (stating that "the doctrine recognizes that there are situations %her a
plaintiffs reputation is already so badly tarnished in connection with a particular subject matter that
the individual cannot be further injured by allegedly false statements on that subject"); Donald L
Magnetti, "In the End,Truth Will Out"... Or Will I?, 52 MO. L REV. 299, 336-37 (1987): Wayne
M. Serra, New Criticisms of the Libel-ProofPlaintiffDoctrine, 46 CLEV. ST. L REV. 1, 2 (19931
(describing the doctrine as providing "that an individual plaintiff is incapable of being libeled with
respect to one or more issues because his reputation has already been damaged by the prior
dissemination of similar information"); Note, supra note 27, at 1909 (describing the %%holearea as
"the problem of libel plaintiffs who challenge published statements that do not in fact damage their
already sullied reputations"); Hemphill. supra note 27, at 406 (noting that Lcause "reputational
harm has been inflicted by previously published... accounts regarding the plaintiff," the plaintiff is
libel-proof regarding a specific issue); Kite, supra note 27,at 539 (stating that "courts will dismiss
the plaintiff's claim when they deem the plaintiff's reputation to be so damaged already by the
[prior] criminal conduct at issue that the plaintiff would be unable to obtain anything more than
nominal damages"); Marder, supranote 27, at 993 (noting doctrine that "the judge may dismiss the
case... if... a plaintiff's reputation is already so tarnished that any harm caused by the allegedly
defamatory material would only be nominal"); Peyton, supra note 13, at 179, 185 (stating that the
doctrine may be applied when "a person's reputation may be so tarnished that it could not b2
lowered in the eyes of the community" and that "a court may determine that a plaintiff's reputation
is so tarnished with respect to a particular issue that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is libel.prcof
regarding that issue"); Weaver, supra note 27, at 405-06 (stating as the doctrine that -courts may
prohibit recovery by plaintiffs whose reputations have ...already been irrevocably damaged");
Katz, supra note 27,at 1259 (stating "that when a plaintiff's reputation is so diminished at the time
of publication of the allegedly defamatory material that only nominal damages at mot could be
awarded because the person's reputation was not capable of sustaining further harm, the plaintiff is
deemed to be libel-proof as a matter of law").
29. 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975).
30. VINCENT TERESA & THOMAS C. RENNER, MY LIFE INTHf MAFIA (1973).
31. Cardillo,518 F.2d at 639.
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participating in numerous other crimes referred to in the book? The
court of appeals nevertheless held that "as a matter of law," the plaintiff

was "libel-proof,... so unlikely by virtue of his life as a habitual
criminal to be able to recover anything other than nominal damages as to
warrant dismissal of the case, involving as it does First Amendment
considerations."33 The court noted that the plaintiff was serving twentyone years for federal felonies related to stolen securities and bail
jumping, conspiracy, and interstate transportation of stolen securities.'
He was previously convicted of receiving stolen property, admitted
associating with the author of the book, and there was evidence
indicating that he frequented an establishment where the mob hung out."
The origin of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine36 in Cardillo was an
inauspicious and precarious beginning. First, to support its rule, the court
relied on two federal cases applying a federal in forma pauperis statute
where the issue was whether the plaintiff should be precluded from
proceeding under the statute because the claim was deemed frivolous.37

That statute was not involved in Cardillo. Second, the court did not
undertake to address state law in the context of its libel-proof plaintiff
holding, despite the fact that state law would presumably govern the
plaintiff's common law libel claim." Third, the court's evaluation of the
facts that supposedly rendered the plaintiff libel-proof seemed
superficial and conclusory 9 And finally, the court also apparently rested
32. See id. at 640.
33. Id.at 639.
34. See id. at 640.
35. See id.
36. Commentators commonly trace the origins of the doctrine to Cardillo v. Doubleday &
Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975). See Note, supra note 27, at 1909-10; Hemphill, supra note
27, at 406.
37. See Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 639-40; see also Serra, supra note 28, at 2-5 (discussing the
court's use of precedent in Cardillo); Kite, supra note 27, at 549 & n.81 (commenting that the
doctrine was born in federal court and "rooted only shallowly in state law" because the court relied
on cases which in turn dealt with the narrow question of the operation of the federal in forma
pauperis statute). The Cardillo court relied on two federal district court decisions addressing the in
forma pauperis statute. See Urbano v. Sondern, 41 F.R.D. 355, 357 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 13
(2d Cir. 1966); Mattheis v. Hoyt, 136 F. Supp. 119, 124-25 (W.D. Mich. 1955). Interestingly, in
affirming the lower court decision in Urbano, the court of appeals held on alternative grounds that
the action would also be precluded under the falsity element and under the privilege to report on
official proceedings. See Urbano v. Sondern, 370 F.2d 13, 14 (2d Cir. 1966). Thus, the analysis later
relied on in support of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine was not really needed in Urbano.
38. See Kite, supra note, 27 at 549 & n.81 (noting that the Cardillo holding "was rooted only
shallowly in state law").
39. The court did summarize negative details in the plaintiff's background. See Cardillo, 518
F.2d at 640; see also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. But it seemed to apply the libelproof rule in conclusory fashion with little explanation. It simply held that the plaintiff's "record
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its decision at least in part on a belief that there was a constitutional
basis compelling adoption of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine as a

discrete rule.r The Supreme Court, however, has since largely put that

idea to rest.'
The second doctrine (or branch), which I shall refer to here as the

incremental harm doctrine, 2 is similar to its libel-proof-plaintiff sibling,
except that it operates within a narrower frame of reference." Basically,
the incremental harm doctrine provides that if the potentially actionable
parts of a publication do not add significantly to the adverse reputational

impact beyond that attributable to the nonactionable portions of the same
publication,.'

then the defamation claim should, to that extent, be

and relationships or associations" led the court to divine that it could not -envisage an) jury

awarding, or court sustaining, an award under any circumstances for more than a few cents*
damages, even if" the plaintiff were to otherwise prevail on the merits. Cardillo,518 F..d at 640.
40. See Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 639. The court stated that the plaintiff's life as a habitual
criminal "warrant[ed] dismissal of the ease, involving as it does First Amendment considerations."
Id.
41. See discussion infra Part ILB.1.
42. The incremental harm language seems to be the commonly accepted terminology. See
L REV. 371,372
Erin Daly, The IncrementalHarm Doctrine:Is There Life After Masson?, 46 API.
(1993); Hemphill, supranote 27, at 406; Kite, supra note 27, at 530; Pey3ton, supra note 13. at 185.
Some courts misuse the incremental harm terminology vihen they apparently mean to refer to the
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. See e.g., Sargeant v. Serrani, 866 F. Supp. 657, 666 & n.13 D. Conn.
1994) (applying Connecticut law in rejecting the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, but misnaming it the
incremental harm theory); Lee v. City of Rochester, 663 N.Y.S.2d 738. 749 n.l (Sup. Ct. 1997)
(using incremental harm terminology to refer to the libel-proof plaintiff rule); Maguire v. Journal
Sentinel, Inc., 605 N.V.2d 881, 888 (Vis. C. App. 1999) (rejecting the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine, but misnaming it the incremental harm theory), appeal denied, 2000 VVI 36, 612 N.W.2d
732.
43. See Note, supranote 27, at 1912 (stating that "Itrhe incremental [harm] doctrine involves
an examination of the challenged communication rather than a finding of a previously damaged
reputation"); Hemphill, supra note 27,at 406.
44. There may be a variation on the incremental harm theme, %%here the same defendant
makes nonactionable statements, but in a different publication. Some authorities seem to assume
that for some reason the doctrine would not operate in that context. See Mardar, sripranote 27, at
1013-14. It would seem, however, that the doctrine still might operate there, but it would be more of
a hybrid of the two doctrines. See Barker v. Huang, No. CIV.A.90C-05-250, 1994 W\\682566. at
*5 (Del. Super. C. Oct. 28, 1994). Here there were separate statements at different times, but by the
same defendant-statements made in a prior case that were not actionable, and a subequent
statement made to a newspaper reporter. See id. at *3.The court seemed to distinguisi the instant
case from the typical incremental harm scenario because the two statements occurred at different
Then, the court articulated its decision in favor of
times (and in different publications). See id. at *5.
the defendant in terms of causation principles, saying: "There simply is no evidence of additional
harm done to Barker by Huang's statement at that time." Id. Therefore, there %vasno actionable
claim because the court found that the defendant's allegedly actionable "statement caused no
additional injury." Id. On the question of the effect of prior publication of a defamatory statement,
see infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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dismissed or at least ultimately denied.'5 Thus, if nonactionable
statements were capable of causing most of the reputational harm, so
that the negative effect of the actionable statements is (and here the
terminology
varies)
"minimal,, 6 4 "minor, '
"negligible,"4
4
9
'
"incremental," "nominal [and] 'incremental, ' . "far less,"'" "'nominal
2
035
or nonexistent, ' ' 5 or of "no significant damage, 53 then the case should
be dismissed. One writer summarized the doctrine with the metaphor
that "having decided we must allow a tempest, it is futile to punish a
squall." ' 4 Judge Preska offers the most insightful judicial guidance on
deciding whether to apply the doctrine, stating: "Since this analysis is

45. For background on the incremental harm doctrine, see 1 SACK, supra note 9, § 2.4.18, at
2-62 to 2-68 (describing "the principle that where true statements accompany a false one and the
'incremental harm' done by the falsity is negligible, recovery is... forbidden"); Thomas B. Kelley
& Steven D. Zansberg, Why Courts Should Require PlaintiffsClaiming Losses to Prove That Falsitv
Caused Them, COMM. LAW., Fall 1997, at 8, 9; Serra, supra note 28, at 2 (stating that "[i]f the effect
of nonactionable statements outweighs the damage done by the challenged statements, then the
action is dismissed on the basis that the challenged statements could not have done the plaintiff any
further harm"); Note, supra note 27, at 1909 (stating that it "bars libel awards when an article or
broadcast contains highly damaging statements, but the plaintiff challenges only a minor assertion
in the communication as false and defamatory"); Jay Framson, Comment, The First Cut Is the
Deepest, but the Second May Be Actionable: Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. and the
Incremental Harm Doctrine, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1483, 1484 (1992) (describing the doctrine as
"hold[ing] that a plaintiff is not entitled to burden a defendant with a libel suit if the statements
challenged ... damage his or her reputation far less than the unchallenged or nonactionable
portion"); Hemphill, supra note 27, at 406 (stating that "[i]f the challenged statement harms the
plaintiffs reputation far less than the true (or nonactionable) portions of the statement, the
incremental harm branch may be applied"); Kite, supra note 27, at 542-43 (stating that where "a
significant portion of' challenged statements in a defendant's publication is "nonactionable," and
"the remaining potentially actionable statements do no incremental harm to the plaintiff's reputation
in light of the harm caused by the nonactionable statements," the court will dismiss); Marder, supra
note 27, at 993 (describing doctrine where "a judge may dismiss the action when nonactionable
statements within an article or group of statements challenged damage a plaintiffs reputation to
such a degree that the incremental harm caused by the actionable statements is only minimal");
Peyton, supranote 13, at 185 (stating that under the doctrine "[i]f the court finds that the actionable
statements cause the plaintiff no appreciable harm beyond that caused by the non-actionable
statements, the court may dismiss the case"); Katz, supranote 27, at 1259.
46. Marder, supranote 27, at 993; Peyton, supra note 13, at 192.
47. Note, supra note 27, at 1909.
48. 1 SACK, supranote 9, § 2.4.18, at 2-63.
49. Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying New
York law in recognizing the doctrine in principle, but finding it inapplicable to the instant case).
50. Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 45, at 9 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 310 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
51. Hemphill, supranote 27, at 406.
52. Tonnessen v. Denver Publ'g Co., 5 P.3d 959,965 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Herbert,
781 F.2d at 311).
53. Daly, supra note 42, at 372.
54. Kite, supra note 27, at 558.
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addressed to increments, it is appropriate to examine questions of kind,
degree and nature.""
Sirmnons Ford,Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,16 is

usually credited with starting the incremental harm doctrine.Y A
Consumer Reports article had stated that an electric-powered vehicle

failed to meet mandatory federal regulations, when in fact those
supposedly mandatory regulations described in the article were not in
existence at the relevant time'" In an alternative holding,9 the court held
that the incorrect statement in the defendant's article regarding the
vehicle's status with respect to federal safety standards was not

actionable.'0 The court reasoned that the adverse effect of the inaccurate
portion of the article could not harm the plaintiffs' reputations beyond
the harm already caused by the remainder of the article, "[g]iven the

abysmal performance and safety evaluations
[nonactionable portions of the] article."'"

detailed

in the

The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines are similar
in the sense that they both treat reputation as static and monolithic." The

only difference is a functional one relating to the frame of reference
considered in determining the preexisting nature of the plaintiff's

reputational interest. And indeed, the two doctrines may even "arise in
the same case."

3

55. Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying New
York law in recognizing the doctrine in principle, but finding it inapplicable to the instant casz). In
deciding not to apply the doctrine in the instant case, the court relied on the difference b-wean the
otherwise actionable and nonactionable statements with respect to their source (attributable to law
enforcement sources versus other sources), their number (eleven versus a total of thirty-three), and
their nature (characterizing the plaintiff as responsible for the bombing versus being mrely "a
'prime' suspect"). See id. at 396.
56. 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying New York law).
57. See Note, supra note 27, at 1913. Although the incremental harm doctrine is said to have
originated in Simmons For4 Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), it was apparently given its current nomenclature by the above 1935 Note. The
terminology was reportedly first used in an appellate opinion by Judge Irving R. Kaufman in
Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), who referred to it as "the incremental harm branch
of the libel-proof doctrine." Id. at 310; see also 1 SAcC, supranote 9, § 2-4.18. at 2-65 & n.290.
58. See Simmons Ford,Inc., 516 F. Supp. at745 (applying New York law).
59. The court's primary ground for granting summary judgment for the defendant was the
plaintiff's failure to satisfy the state of mind element--in other words, a failure to prove that the
defendant acted with the required level of fault with respect to the truth or falsity of the statement in
question. See id. at 743-44, 747.
60. See id. at 747.
61. Id. at 750.
62. See Daly, supra note 42, at 387-89.
63. Note, supra note 27, at 1924.
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Both doctrines may be attractive to judges and defense attorneys.
They offer a way of short-circuiting the litigation process by summary
judgment or dismissal. Another advantage of these doctrines over merely
mitigating damages is that dismissal will usually preclude nominal,
presumed, punitive, and mental distress damages for defamation based
on the statement that is the subject of the dismissal.6' Courts can simply
hold as a matter of law that the plaintiff is libel-proof and end it. That
short-circuiting also may obviate the need to parse through the details of
a lengthy publication, examining each part for its defamatory potential
and falsity, and deciding whether it was made with the required faultbased state of mind. Another appeal of these doctrines may also stem
from the fact that they typically arise in a claim by a person with a
criminal record, sometimes a prison inmate."5 Prisoners are obvious
candidates for the libel-proof classification. They are marginalized
citizens. They may also be perceived as posing a special threat of
litigation given their sheer numbers6 and free time.67
For a number of years, the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental
harm doctrines have been confusing works-in-progress, mostly for the
federal courts," bereft of sound jurisprudential underpinnings. They have
hung out there twisting in the rarified air, emanating somewhere
between Erie-educated' guesses on the future direction of state law,
stealthy expressions of federal common law, and (especially early in the
doctrines' evolutions) First Amendment rules of constitutional law7" (or
at least substantive torts principles influenced by First Amendment
sensitivities). Despite their tentative beginnings, the doctrines have
slowly begun garnering more widespread support. Thus, the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine has become more representative of existing state law in
some jurisdictions, and has been approved by a number of decisions in

64. See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
65. See Kite, supra note 27, at 538; Weaver, supra note 27, at 422 (referring to criminal
convictions as "a tangible benchmark of prior damage to reputation").
66. See infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
67. See Urbano v. Sondem, 41 F.R.D. 355, 358 (D. Conn.) (noting a variety of possible
motivations for some prisoners to bring lawsuits, including "[a] desire to harass officials, a hope for
a quick windfall by way of nuisance settlement, or simply a discovery of a new way to pass the
monotonous hours of incarceration"), affd, 370 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1966).
68. See Serra, supra note 28, at 1; see also Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348,
390 & n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying New York law in noting the dearth of analysis in state courts
and the vulnerable nature of the doctrines because of their shaky backgrounds).
69. See Serra, supra note 28, at 8 (discussing the application of state substantive law in
federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction).
70. See discussion infra Part I.B.I.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss2/1

12

King: The Misbegotten Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine and the "Gordian K
20001

THE "GORDIAN KNOT" SIWDROME

both state and federal court (applying state law)' The doctrine has also
been supported by a number of commentators,- but opposed by others"
71. See, e.g., Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers. Inc.. 814 F.2d 1066. 1074 (5th Cir. 1937)
(applying Louisiana law in seeming to approve the doctrine in principle, but then arguably
narrowing its potential effect by holding that a jury question was presented as to %hether the
plaintiffs were in fact libel-proof); Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 293, 299, 303-04
(2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law in noting that with respect to the statement that the plaintiff
"'is married and also has a live-in girlfriend, Kathy Keeton,"' the plaintiff's "reputation re-arding
adultery rendered him libel-proof on [that] subject") (quoting a 1983 issue of Pcntha:se);Printer &
Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 639, 662-63 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (applying Texas law in
approving the doctrine in principle, but finding that defendant did not prove that plaintiff vas libelproof here); Cerasani v. Sony Corp., 991 F. Supp. 343, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying New York
law in holding that the plaintiff who sued for allegedly being depicted in the movie Donnie Brasco
as having committed brutal beatings and vicious murders was "libel-proof as a matter of lav,');
Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F. Supp. 906,914-15 (D. Haw. 1993) (applying Hawaii law in impliedly
approving the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in principle, but finding that in the instant ease the
defendants had not shown that the plaintiff's reputation had been reduced to a level %here he
h.as
libel-proof), aftid, 56 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1995); Wynbzrg v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924.
928 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (applying California law in stating that "[an individual %ho engage in
certain anti-social or criminal behavior and suffers a diminished reputation may be 'ib2l-proof' as a
matter of law, as it relates to that specific behavior") (citing Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518
F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir. 1975)); Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 508 F. Supp. 724. 726 (F-D.
Mo.) (applying the doctrine in granting a motion to dismiss), aff'd on other gr:nds,658 F.2d 603
(8th Cir. 1981); Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618, 622 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (applying Tetn-see
law in holding that the plaintiff who alleged that he was libeled by a statement referring to "him as a
,narcotics addict and peddler' and ... robber" was libel-proof as a habitual criminal) (quoting the
alleged libelous Time article), aqd, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1978); Cofield v. AdvertiFer Co., 486
So. 2d 434, 435 (Ala. 1986) (applying the doctrine and holding that the defendant was entitled to
summary disposition); Jackson v. Longcope, 476 N.1.2d 617, 621 (Mass. 1985); Kevorkian v. Am.
Med. Ass'n, 602 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (stating "that, with respect to the issue of
assisted suicide, plaintiff is virtually 'libel proof") (citing Brooks v. Am. Broad. Cos, 932 F.2d
495,500 (6th Cir. 1991)); DeWitt v. Outlet Broad., Inc., No. C.A. NC 98-0196, 1999 WIL 1334932.
at *5 (RLL Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1999) (applying the doctrine); Coker v. Sundquist No. OIAOI-9805BC-00318, 1998 WL 736655, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998) (stating "that the claimant is a
convicted murderer worthy of deathol ... [and therefore, neither his reputation nor his character
could be impaired by the [alleged] language," and therefore was deemed libel.proof as a matter of
law); Rogers v. Jackson Sun Newspaper, No. CIV.A.C-94-301, 1995 WI. 383000, at *1 (Tenn. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 30, 1995) (holding that the "[p]laintiff's reputation in the community at the tim2 of the
article's publication was so severely tarnished, he is 'libel-proof'"); McBride v. New Braunfels
Herald-Zeimung, 894 S.V.2d 6, 10-11 (Tex. App. 1994) (recognizing the doctrine in principle, but
finding it not applicable because there was "no evidence of the publicity," and the plaintiff's
"criminal history [was not] so extreme that no reasonable person could find further damage to his
reputation by the false accusation of a new robbery"); Finklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742
S.W.2d 512, 518 (Tex. App. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff was "'libel-proof' as to that area of his
character touched by the challenged communications").
72. See, e.g., Gage Jr. & Conniff, supra note 27; Note, supra note 27, at 1926; Hemphill.
supranote 27, at 408.
73. See, e.g., Magnetti, supra note 28, at 336, 345; Marder, supra note 27, at 994 rejecting
the doctrines as "an unjustified over-expansion of [F]irst [A]mendment protections at the cXPense of
victims of conscious and malicious falsehoods"); Peyton, supra note 13, at 10 (rejecting the
doctrine on due process and equal protection grounds).
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Nevertheless, the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine continues to engender
ambivalence in the courts. Some courts caution or imply that the libelproof plaintiff doctrine is a narrow one. 4 Others, while ostensibly

approving the doctrine in principle, nevertheless find it inapplicable in
the instant case." Still others take pains to avoid deciding whether or not
74. See, e.g., Zerangue, 814 F.2d at 1074 (applying Louisiana law in seeming to approve the
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in principle, but then arguably narrowing its potential effect by holding
that a jury question was presented as to whether the plaintiffs were in fact libel-proof); Marcone v.
Penthouse Int'l Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law
in stating that the doctrine was a narrow one and refusing to apply it here, and noting that while the
evidence suggested that the plaintiff's "reputation was sullied before the article was published," the
court could not "say as a matter of law that [the plaintiff] was libel proof"); Broome v. Biondi, No.
96 CIV. 0805 RLC., 1997 WL 83295, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1997) (applying New York law in
recognizing the doctrine in principle, but refusing to apply it to the instant facts); Finklea, 742
S.w.2d at 516 (noting "that the doctrine should have only a limited application which presents the
difficult problem of defining its scope," that "ihere are few so impure that cannot be traduced,"
and "[allthough a person's general reputation may be so bad as to render him libel proof on all
matters, ordinarily even the public outcast's remaining good reputation is entitled to protection");
Langston v. Eagle Publ'g Co., 719 S.W.2d 612, 623 (Tex. App. 1986) (implying a limited scope for
the doctrine by giving Adolph Hitler or Charles Manson or persons "with an equally despicable
reputation" as examples of libel-proof persons); Note, supra note 27, at 1924 (cautioning that the
doctrine should apply "[o]nly if ajudge finds that the challenged statement describes activity neither
significantly different in degree nor altogether different in kind from the plaintiff's reputed
activities"). In Zerangue, the court noted that the jury would decide whether the plaintiff was libelproof, and would have to consider whether, as the plaintiffs contended, "passage of six years had
allowed them to improve their standing." Zerangue, 814 F.2d at 1074. Moreover, the court noted
that whether the plaintiffs had improved their standing involved "credibility questions" for which
summary judgment was not appropriate. See id. Additionally, it has sometimes been suggested that
evidence that the plaintiff's reputation has been diminished as a result of prior publications should
not be sufficient to support the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. See Marder, supra note 27, at 1014
(noting that "[flalse allegations in other articles are insufficient to render a plaintiff libel proof');
infra note 235.
75. See Zerangue, 814 F.2d at 1074 (applying Louisiana law in seeming to approve the libelproof plaintiff doctrine in principle, but then narrowing its potential effect by holding that a jury
question was presented as to whether plaintiffs were in fact libel-proof, and specifically stating that
the jury would have to consider whether, as plaintiffs contended, "the passage of six years had
allowed them to improve their standing," a question that involved "credibility questions" for which
summary judgment was not appropriate); Procter& Gamble Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (applying
Texas law in approving the doctrine in principle, but finding that the defendant did not prove that
the plaintiff was libel-proof here); Partington, 825 F. Supp. at 915 & n.7 (applying Hawaii law in
impliedly approving the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in principle, but finding that in the instant case
the defendants had not shown that the plaintiffs reputation had been reduced to a level where he
was libel-proof); McBride, 894 S.W.2d at 10-11 (finding the doctrine inapplicable because there
was no evidence of publicity of the plaintiff's reputation and the court could not find "his criminal
history ... so extreme that no reasonable person could find further damage to his reputation by the
false accusation of a new robbery"); cf Brooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 502 (6th Cir.
1991) (applying Ohio law in holding, without approving or disapproving the libel-proof doctrine in
principle, that the doctrine was not applicable unless prior dissemination reached the same audience
as the allegedly defamatory statement, and was coterminous with the alleged defamation, noting that
"no popular nationwide television program or other publicity had portrayed [the plaintiff] as a

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss2/1

14

King: The Misbegotten Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine and the "Gordian K
20001

THE "GORDIAN KNOT" SYNDROME

to adopt the doctrine even in principle'.6 Finally, some have explicitly
rejected or refused to approve the doctrine."

The incremental harm doctrine has also slowly been gaining
adherents in the courts, 7 although some cases approving the doctrine

have limited its application," and others have rejected the doctrine." In
'hitman' for a corrupt judge, a 'pimp,' a 'museleman,' or a 'street knowledgeable jive turkey'")
(quoting a 20/20 episode).
76. See, e.g., Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1072, 10S0 (3d Cir. 1938)
(applying New Jersey law); Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1079 (applying Pennsylvania law).
77. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563. 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (Scalia. J.)
(applying District of Columbia law in stating that "we cannot envision how a court would go about
determining that someone's reputation had already been 'irreparably' damaged-i.e.. that no new
reader could be reached by the freshest libel"), vacated on other groands, 477 U.S. 242 (1986);
Sargeant v. Serrani, 866 F. Supp. 657, 666 & n.13 (D. Conn. 1994) (applying Connecticut law in
rejecting the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, but misnaming it the incremental harm theory); Maguire
v. Journal Sentinel, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 881, 888 (NVis. CL App. 1999) (rejecting the libel.preof
plaintiff doctrine, although misnaming it the incremental harm theory), appealdenied,2000 WI 36.
612 N.W.2d 732.
78. See Jewel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348,390-96 (S.D.N.Y. 19981 (applying
New York law in recognizing the doctrine in principle, but finding it inapplicable to the instant
case); Jones v. Globe Int'l, Inc., No. 3:94:CV01468, 1995 WL 819177, at *9 (D.Conn. Sept. 26,
1995) (applying Connecticut law); Desnick v. Capital CitiesABC, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 303, 312-13
(N.D.M11
1994) (applying Illinois law in stating that since "'significantly greater opprobrium' would
not result from the" allegedly false portions of the publication, the defamation count was
dismissed), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub non. Dasnick v. Am Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351
(7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply the doctrine at that stage of the proceedings); Tonnessen v.
Denver Publ'g Co., 5 P.3d 959, 965 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (approving and defining the incremental
harm doctrine to mean that "when unchallenged or nonactionable parts of a particular publication
are damaging, another statement, though maliciously false, may not be actionable because it causes
no harm beyond the harm caused by the remainder of the publication"); Gannett Co. v. Re, 496
A.2d 553, 558 (Del 1985) (recognizing the incremental harm doctrine in principle, but finding it
inapplicable because at least a jury question was presented as to whether the allegedly actionable
statement "caused the real damage to [the plaintiff's] reputation"); Brite Metal Treating Inc. v.
Schuler, No. 62360, 1993 WL 158256, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 13, 1993) (approving the
incremental harm doctrine). For factual variations on the incremental harm theme., see infra Part
)iLB.3.
79. In Tonnessen, a newspaper was sued for reporting the in-court statements by the
plaintiff's former wife accusing him of marital rape, and reporting out-of-court statements by the
wife's sister to the effect that the wife had told the sister essentially that the plaintiff had forced his
wife to have sex with him. See Tonnessen, 5 P.3d at 962, 964. Reporting the wife's accusations
were privileged under the privilege to report official proceedings, the court held that the report of
the sister's remarks, even if not privileged, was subject to the incremental harm doctrine and
therefore not actionable. See id. at 964-65. The court reasoned that "[tlo
hold otherwise would allow
[the plaintiff] to do indirectly what he could not do directly, that is, to make [the defendantnewspaper] liable for accurately reporting the wife's in-court statement." Id. at 966. The court
cautioned that it was adopting a "limited application of the incremental harm doctrine" and was
limiting the doctrine to situations involving "two separate repetitions of an identical accusatio." Id.
The court explained that:
There is no suggestion anywhere that the sister had any independent knovledge of %%hat
actually occurred between [the plaintift] and the wife, and the newspaper's act of adding
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the most notable opinion opposing the incremental harm doctrine, then
Judge Antonin Scalia called it "a fundamentally bad idea."'"
Commentators also disagree on the wisdom of the incremental harm

doctrine, with a number of commentators supporting the doctrine,8" and a
few opposing it. 3
B. Gropingfor a Rationale
A number of rationales have been posited in an attempt to justify
the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines. None of them
seem up to the task. These ostensible rationales for the doctrines are
summarized below.
1. First Amendment

Early in their development, the doctrines were variously tied to a
constitutional foundation in the First Amendment, aimed at protecting
freedom of expression. 4 Indeed, the early federal cases where the
doctrines originated seemed to assume the doctrines were mandated by
the First Amendment." The view of the doctrines as directly compelled

the sister's words about what the wife had told her did not do more than convey the same
allegation contained in the privileged, non-actionable statement.
Id.
80. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 960 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
adopt the incremental harm doctrine as a matter of California law, and viewing the Supreme Court
decision in Masson as "severely undermin[ing] the case authority that generated the doctrine in the
first place"); Liberty Lobby, Inc., 746 F.2d at 1568-69 (applying District of Columbia law in stating
that "the theory must be rejected because it rests upon the assumption that one's reputation is a
monolith, which stands or falls in its entirety," and rejecting the theory as "a fundamentally bad
idea").
81. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 746 F.2d at 1569. For more on the court's reasoning in Liberty Lobby,
Inc., see infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
82. See Daly, supra note 42, at 372-73; Note, supra note 27, at 1925; Framson, supra note 45,
at 1485; Hemphill, supranote 27, at 408; Kite, supranote 27, at 560-62.
83. See Marder, supranote 27, at 1013-14.
84. See Gage Jr. & Conniff, supra note 27; Hemphill, supra note 27, at 408-13; Kite, supra
note 27, at 540 nn.33-34, 543 n.45; Marder, supra note 27, at 999-1002. Kite elaborates that the
rules inspired by the First Amendment prior to adoption of the libel-proof and incremental harm
doctrines do not afford enough protection for the press (because of the costs of fact-finding in
litigation under the rules). See Kite, supra note 27, at 546-47. Therefore, according to Kite, we still
need "judicial tools allowing for the fast, fair, and efficient disposition of fruitless libel suits" in
order to "conserv[e] scarce judicial resources and reinforc[e] First Amendment free speech
interests." Id. at 547-48.
85. See Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying New
York law in stating opaquely that the case warranted dismissal "involving as it does First
Amendment considerations"); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 516
F. Supp. 742, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (reasoning in support of the incremental harm doctrine that the
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by the First Amendment has now largely been foreclosed by a
combination of two Supreme Court cases that leave the matter up to the
states. In Masson v.New Yorker Magazine, Inc.," the Court stated
unequivocally that "we reject any suggestion that the incremental harm
doctrine is compelled as a matter of First Amendment protection for
speech."' And although the Court was addressing the incremental harm
doctrine, its reasoning would seem to be equally applicable to the libelproof plaintiff doctrine. Viewing the scope of First Amendment
restriction somewhat narrowly, the Court reasoned that "[t]he question
of incremental harm does not bear upon whether a defendant has
published a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."' It could have made the same statement
about the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, which is likewise not derived
from the state of mind element. Thus, it would appear that neither the
incremental harm nor the libel-proof plaintiff doctrines are constitutional
imperatives. Accordingly, although there was, in the Court's mind, no
indication whether California
accepted the incremental harm doctrine,
9
"it remains free to do so."
Not to be denied a constitutional rationale, some courts have
attempted to extrapolate from the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc." holding
to come up with a credible constitutional basis for the doctrines.' Gertz
held that recovery in defamation cases was constitutionally limited to
"plaintiffs reputational interest in avoiding further adverse comment" on his electric car was
"minimal when compared with the First Amendment interests at stake").
86. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
87. Id. at 523.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
91. See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511, 1519 1D.NJ. 1986) (applying
New Jersey law), rev'd on other grounds, 847 F.2d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding on appeal

that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine did not apply under the facts presented and therefore the court
of appeals did not have to address the question of the availability, in the absence of a shoving of
compensable injury to reputation, of nominal and punitive damages); McBride v. New Braunfels
Herald-Zeitung, 894 S.AV.2d 6, 10 (Tex. App. 1994); infra notes 106-09 (discussing Schiatone).
Extrapolating from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the court in McBride reasoned
that Gertz, in the absence of showing of actual malice, limits recovery to actual injury. See McBride.

894 S.W.2d at 10. And actual injury, the argument goes, is impossible "[w]hen the reputation of a
plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, have suffered from a libel." Id. The court -ddzd that
"[d]efendants who have prevailed under the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine have essentially negated,

as a matter of law, the element of damages in the plaintiffs libel action." Id.The problem with the
court's analysis is that it is unclear whether the Gertz rule is an "element," or perhaps more Ikel

simply a limitation on damages. The McBride analysis may also overlook the limitations on Gertz
and the effect of Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See infra text accompanying no:cs
94-98.
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"actual injury,"9 2 at least in matters of public concern and in the absence
of a showing that the defendant acted with knowledge or reckless
disregard of the statement's truth or falsity.93 Drawing a constitutional
mandate for the doctrines from the preceding language seems

problematic, however. In the first place, the Court later in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone4 held that states may award damages for mental distress in a
defamation claim without additional objective proof of harm to
reputation.95 And Gertz specifically held that actual injury includes

"personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.'' Moreover,
the Gertz rule limiting damages does not apply unless the defamatory
statement was about a matter of public concern?9 And, even when the
statement does concern a matter of public concern, the Gertz rule does
not apply if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the statement.93
Additionally, there is a question whether the small supposedly de

minimis reputational losses that are ignored under libel-proof and
incremental harm doctrines would ipso facto not be deemed "actual
injury." Therefore, it seems doubtful that the Gertz actual-injury

language constitutionally compels adoption of the libel-proof plaintiff or
incremental harm doctrines.
2. Judicial Resources

A second rationale commonly advanced in support of the doctrines
is that they preserve judicial resources. 99 Thus, one court noted that since

92. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, 350.
93. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985); Gertz,
418 U.S. at 349.
94. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
95. See id. at 460. Thus, in Firestone the fact that the plaintiff had withdrawn her claim for
damages to reputation did not prevent her from claiming damages for emotional distress. See id.
Thus, objectively measurable damages from harm to reputation were apparently not constitutionally
compelled here. See id. The Court added that "[lthis does not transform the action into something
other than an action for defamation as that term is meant in Gertz." Id.
96. 418 U.S. at 350.
97. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 763; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
98. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 763.
99. See Note, supranote 27, at 1917; Hemphill, supra note 27, at 417-18; Kite, supra note 27,
at 562; Marder, supra note 27, at 993 (discussing but rejecting this rationale for present purposes).
Hemphill also argues that even self-restraint from what he calls the "[e]conomic rationality" (of
avoiding the costs of litigation) does not work well here because of the tendency to overestimate
chances of success and to try for punitive damages. See Hemphill, supra note 27, at 418. Of course,
rather than promote the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines, a better response would
be to directly address the elements and damages rules, such as by eliminating punitive damages
altogether.
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individuals with "despicable reputation[s]" could not be damaged, "a
court's time and resources should not be expended in litigating their
spurious libel claims.""' The appeal of the doctrine can be illustrated by
cases like Jackson v. Longcope' ° There, the plaintiff who was serving a
life sentence for first-degree murder, sued for libel based on a Boston
Globe story. 2 He alleged that a report of a shoot-out "involv[ing] a
stolen car chase"'03 was erroneous because the car was not stolen, and
that a report about "the 'hitch-hike murders"' was erroneous because not
all the victims were raped nor were all strangled.' The court simply
held that the plaintiff was libel-proof.""
The judicial-resources rationale, however, is questionable. It seems
to assume that merely because a claim might be dismissed under the
doctrines it necessarily translates into significant judicial savings. This
may not be a valid assumption. Application of either doctrine inevitably
inspires lengthy appeals. Most cases will also have already undergone
years of pretrial investigation and discovery. Consider Schiaione
ConstructionCo. v. Time, Inc.,t " Which is all too typical of the pattern in
cases in which the libel-proof plaintiff or incremental harm doctrines
figure centrally. There, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff was libel-proof!'t
Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed without deciding whether to
approve the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine even in principle, and held
instead that the doctrine, whatever its standing in principle, did not apply
to the facts of the instant case.' The case was finally settled after six
years of litigation.'O Far from conserving judicial resources, the libelproof and incremental harm doctrines, adrift as they are from the
traditional elements of defamation law, add uncertainty to a legal picture
already sinking under the weight of historical baggage and constitutional
modulation. The injection of these doctrines into a case almost assures a
prolonged appellate process.
100. Langston v. Eagle Publ'g Co., 719 S.W.2d 612,623 (Tex. App. 1986).
101. 476 N.E.2d 617 (Iass.

1985).

102. See id. at 618.
103. Id. at 621.

104. See id.
105. See iL
106. 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).

107. See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511, 1520 (D.NJ. 1986) lapplying
New Jersey law), rev'd in partand qffd in parl, 847 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988) Ire%ersing tha

district court's application of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine under the facts presnted).
108. See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc.. 847 F.2d 1069. 1081 O3d Cir. 1988).

109. See Weaver, supra note 27, at 411 n.54; Alexander Stille, Libel Law Tges an a New
Look, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 1988, at 1.
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The second problem with this argument is that the same could be
said for any theory of liability. "' If we apply it here, then why not to any
loss? Some cases approving the incremental harm doctrine have gone so
far as to espouse and articulate a balancing test of sorts."' Application of
the doctrine should, it is contended, depend on whether "the damages
that flow from the non-actionable portions of a statement merit the
expense of defending against a libel action where the harm caused by the
actionable portions is incremental.""' 2 That test is stated somewhat
differently as "whether society is better off permitting such suits to go
forward in light of the costs of defending such suits.""' 3 Such a balancing
approach is arbitrary in that it is imposed on some victims in defamation
lawsuits, but not others, and is not imposed on most claimants in other
types of torts at all. Its application is also problematic. How does one
estimate the costs saved? Does the defendant or its insurer improve its
chances for invoking the doctrine by retaining higher-priced lawyers,
thereby raising the cost side of a balancing equation?
3. The First Amendment-Lite
A third rationale is an amalgam of the first two. Without deriving a
mandatory rule of constitutional law, it nevertheless looks to the interest
in freedom of expression for direction." 4 Thus, one recent case stated
that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine was needed "so that the costs of
defending against the claim of libel, which can themselves impair
vigorous freedom of expression, will be avoided.""' This rationale is
simply a variation of a balancing of interests analysis-protection of an
already diminished reputation against costs of litigation and potential
liability-with the interests of freedom of expression added to the
calculus. But, once the Supreme Court determined that constitutional
(First Amendment) principles do not compel adoption of the doctrines as
110. One commentator makes the point with the following hypothetical illustration:
If person X has $100 in her wallet and person Y steals $99, X can sue Y for
conversion. If X has $2 in her wallet and Y steals $1, X can still sue Y for conversion.
The courts do not deny X a remedy simply because X had little to steal.
Peyton, supra note 13, at 213.
111. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying
New York law).
112. Id.at392.
113. Id.at393.
114. See Hemphill, supra note 27, at 411; Weaver, supra note 27, at 412.
115. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New
York law). The language from Guccione has been quoted with approval in recent cases applying the
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Outlet Broad., Inc., No. C.A. NC 98-0196, 1999
WL 1334932, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1999).
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mandatory restraints on the range of doctrinal options available to state
courts,"6 we are left with the question of why already marginalized
persons should be automatically categorically excluded from the process
of seeking vindication of their reputations.
4. Interest Analysis
Some commentators have focused on "the main interestfl"" 7 served
by defamation law, namely protection of reputation, as justification for
the doctrines. The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, it is argued, is consistent
with this interest analysis because the reputations of some people have
already been so diminished "that any harm resulting from the libelous
statements will be so inconsequential as to fall outside libel law's
interest in protecting private reputations from harm.""' This rationale
simply begs the question; whether a person has suffered harm from a
false statement really depends on the core elements defining the cause of
action for defamation, on the rules determining the measure of damages,
and on how one perceives the reputational interests at stake. The libelproof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines mask the failure of the
courts to address and analyze the difficult elemental and remedial
defamation questions.

5. Distrust of Juries
Another impetus for the doctrines, though seldom acknowledged as
such, is the perceived need to bridle jury discretion."' The influence of

First Amendment concerns are also evident here, with the libel-proof
and incremental harm doctrines seen as tools "to maintain the
constitutionally mandated level of supervision over factfinders in libel
cases."' And driving this concern is the possibility that the jury will
award damages "in excess of actual injury."'-' There are a number of
problems with this purported rationale. It is doubtful that either the libelproof plaintiff or incremental harm doctrine is constitutionally
compeled.'2 Moreover, distrust of juries could be argued against

116. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 523 (1991).
117. Kite, supranote 27, at 540.
118. Id.
119. See Note, supra note 27, at 1917.

120. Id.
121. Id. Some commentators, while acknowledging that eschewing the doctrines would leave
juries with a good deal of latitude, still favor eliminating the doctrines so as not to deny plaintiffs a
remedy. See Marder, supranote 27, at 1016-17.
122- See discussion supraPart ILB.I.
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virtually any theory of tort liability in which damages are the principle
remedy.
6. Denunciatory Goals
"The denunciatory feature of"' criminal law has also been
suggested as a justification for the doctrines. Accordingly, some view
the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine as a sensible way of serving the public's
interest in reporting criminal activity and denouncing crime by
subjecting criminals to "public shame."' 24 The problem with this
justification is that a previously convicted person has already been
punished by the criminal law, and in that way has already been publicly
denounced for his crimes. Where is the public interest in licensing false
reports of additional crimes, at least beyond the latitude inherent in the
rigorous elements for defamation and accorded by the traditional
privilege to report on official proceedings?"
7. Declining Importance of Reputation
Occasionally, a sort of "so what" argument is thrown in for good
measure to justify the doctrines. Essentially, the argument is that
reputation in general is less important today. 6 People no longer live in
small communities, and in any event they have less respect for media,
thereby lessening the potential impact of defamatory falsehoods.'
Others note that, in general, "[t]he mobility and anonymity of modem
J " thereby lessening the need
society make rehabilitation much easier[,]"
to some extent for legal redress. Several responses to all of these
observations come to mind. One danger in viewing reputation as a
debased currency is that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. And in
any event, modification of the remedial scheme should be effectuated by
addressing the legal principles governing the elements and damages
rules of defamation law, and thoughtfully exploring the contours of the
underlying interest generally.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
747, 778

Kite, supranote 27, at 552.
Id.
See discussion infra Part ll.C.3.
See Kite, supranote 27, at 560.
See id.
David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(1984) (making the point in another context).
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8. Equities
There has also been a suggestion of an equitable (or perhaps even
an estoppel-type) rationale for the doctrines.' : The response to a person
whose reputation is serially damaged by adverse publicity is that the
plaintiff should not have waited so long to address the problem, and
presumably should have sued earlier. Thus, one commentator opined
that "[a] plaintiff whose reputation has been repeatedly and extensively
damaged should not be allowed to select one, late-coming commentary
on which to stake his revival.' ' 0 This type of equitable-estoppel
justification, however, ignores the fact that many, perhaps most, people
are not litigious by nature. In fact, undertaking a lawsuit for any purpose
usually carries with it considerable psychological upheaval. This
rationale also seems circular in the present context. One of the drivers
for the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine has, I believe, been a concern that
prison inmates, with all that free time on their hands, should not be
allowed to develop too much of a taste for litigation, especially for
communicative torts.' It seems inconsistent to say on the one hand that
we do not want prisoners to waste the legal system's time by suing for
defamation and therefore we need the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, and
then turn around and say that the rationale for denying them legal redress
(and by extension for the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine) is because they
should have sued earlier.
9. The Dark Side
There is another rationale, seldom articulated, although one I
suspect is never far from the surface. It is that libel-proof plaintiffs
categorically are different from the rest of us.' They are imperfect
souls, damaged goods. It is not hard to imagine why this ground is not
acknowledged as such. The very idea that a category of persons should

129. See generally Note, supranote 27, at 1923-24.
130. Id. at 1924; cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833, 870

(1992) (O'Connor, L,plurality opinion) (explaining why the line determining the point before
which a woman has the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy should be drawn at viability.
saying that "[t]he viability line ... has, as a practical matter, an clement of fairness" bzeause "(iln
some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the
State's intervention on behalf of the developing child").

131. See Urbano v. Sondem, 41 F.R.D. 355, 358 (D.Conn.) (noting a variety of passible
motivations for some prisoners to bring lawsuits, including "[a]
desire to harass officials, a hop for
a quick windfall by way of nuisance settlement, or simply a discovery of a new way to pass the
monotonous hours of incarceration"), afrd, 370 F.2d 13 12d Cir. 1966); supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
132. See discussion infra Part ILC.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 29:343

be written off as forever lost is, as will be explained, 33 inconsistent with
our notions of a society of dynamic freedoms and self-realization.
C. Common Criticismsof the Doctrines
Although some version of the doctrines has begun to increasingly
appear in the cases, this development has not gone without some
criticism. These criticisms are identified below.
1. Vindication of Reputation
The most straightforward criticism is that the doctrines, by shortcircuiting the plaintiff's lawsuit, thereby preclude vindication of the
plaintiff's reputation, at least vindication through the judicial process."
Supporters of the doctrines answer this criticism with the argument that
any costs 35 to victims are outweighed by the interest of judicial
economy.1
2. Redress for Emotional Distress
Some commentators have noted that an increasingly important role
for the defamation cause of action is not only to redress diminution of
the plaintiff's reputational standing as such, but also to compensate for
the emotional distress the plaintiff suffered because his or her reputation
has been sullied.'36 To the extent that the libel-proof or incremental harm
doctrine terminates a plaintiffs defamation lawsuit, those doctrines also
preclude recovery for the plaintiffs emotional distress under the
defamation cause of action. Therefore, the doctrines could be subject to
criticism on that basis. Defenders of the doctrines answer that emotional
cause of action
distress 3 ' should only be recoverable under a defamation
3
if there is first proven to be actual harm to reputation. 1

133. See discussion infra Part III.C.
134. See Hemphill, supra note 27, at 417-18 (noting this criticism, but arguing in favor of the
doctrines that the interest of judicial economy outweighs it); Marder, supra note 27, at 994; Peyton,
supra note 13, at 205, 208.
135. See Hemphill, supra note 27, at 417-18 (noting this criticism, but arguing in favor of the
doctrines that the interest of judicial economy outweighs it).
136. See Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 19 (1983) (noting in the context of defamation law generally "that the
bulk of the money paid out in damage awards in defamation suits is to compensate for psychic
injury, rather than to compensate for any objectively verifiable damage to one's community
standing").
137. See generally Hemphill, supra note 27, at 420.
138. See id.
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Proponents of the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm
doctrines may miss the mark here. Perhaps plaintiffs should not be
permitted to recover in defamation for emotional distress without
adequate proof of sufficiently demonstrable harm to reputation. But that
does not mean that the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm
doctrines are the appropriate vehicles for achieving that policy
preference. This issue should be resolved and clarified directly and
forthrightly by the courts. Trying to address it obliquely through the
expedients of the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines is
not the way.
3. Well-Informed Public
Another possible criticism is that, by failing to redress otherwise
actionable defamatory falsehoods, the doctrines prevent defamation law
from fully promoting accuracy in the dissemination of information!" Of
course, the rejoinder is that a vigorous First Amendment and a
reasonably uninhibited press and public are even more crucial than
unrestricted overly aggressive defamation litigation in facilitating the
accurate flow of information."0
4. Deterrence
A related criticism of the doctrines is that by restricting defamation
claims, they thereby undermine the deterrent effects of defamation law,
and thus abet dissemination of false and hurtful information.'' The
on the
response to this criticism is that although defamation claims deter
2
other.M
the
on
expression
of
freedom
chill
also
they
one hand,
5. Nonactionable Parts
The incremental harm doctrine has been singled out for criticism
out of concern that conceptually, if the doctrine were broadly applied, it
could operate to preclude a plaintiff in situations where the
nonactionable part of the publication was nonactionable for reasons
other than its truthfulness.' 3 For instance, parts of a publication might be
false and very injurious, but still nonactionable not because they were

139. See id. at 423 (discussing the argument, but rejecting it and endorsing the doctrines).
140. See generally R. Hayes Johnson, Jr., Case Note, Defamation in Cyberspace: A Court

Takes a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway in Stratton Oakznont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., 49 ARK. L. REv. 589,601 (1996).
141.

See Peyton, supranote 13, at 208.

142. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,334 (1974).
143. See Marder,supranote 27, at 1004.
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true, but because the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant acted
with the required fault-based state of mind with respect to his or her
belief as to the truth or falsity of the statement.'"
Commentators have also worried that the challenged portions of the
publication that are insulated from liability by the incremental harm
doctrine might thereby serve to potentiate or validate the nonactionable
parts. Thus, it is argued that otherwise actionable parts may do damage
by "add[ing] a note of validity to the main proposition advanced by the
entire article."'4
The problem with this debate is that focusing on the incremental
harm doctrine burkes the underlying issue. That issue is how we are to
define causation for the purposes of defamation law. The debate here
should be about the elements, particularly causation.
6. Arbitrariness
The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines have also
been called arbitrary. Various illustrations have been used to make this
point. For example, one writer contrasts the operation of the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine with a hypothetical conversion claim.'46 Why, she asks
rhetorically, should a victim who had only one dollar stolen still have a
right to sue for conversion, but victims whose characters have been
libeled be denied "an opportunity to present their case to a jury simply
because a judge subjectively decides the plaintiffs have little or no
reputation to lose."'47
The incremental harm doctrine has also been decried as arbitrary.
One commentator illustrates this criticism with a hypothetical example
involving two victims, each libeled.1 48 Victim X is attacked in ten false
statements appearing in a publication, but the court dismisses the action
because it finds nine of the statements nonactionable.'49 Victim Y was
also attacked by ten statements, but those are written by separate authors
in separate articles, nine by one author and one by another. 50 If the nine
statements by one author are nonactionable, but the one statement by the
other author is actionable, then in this example, the incremental harm

144. See id.
145. Id. at 1013. For a case involving this type of scenario, see Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298,
310 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law).
146. See Peyton, supra note 13, at 213.
147. Id.
148. See Marder, supra note 27, at 1013-14.
149. See id.
150. See id.
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doctrine" would not apply."2 And that, so the argument goes, is
arbitrary.'5
One reason the doctrines are vulnerable to a charge of arbitrariness
is that they appear to operate selectively.4 The solution, as I will show,
is to eschew the doctrines, and instead, address the relevant policy
concerns
through thoughtful development of the elements and damages
155
rules.

7. Federal Courts
One author has criticized the doctrines based on their origins in the
federal courts.'56 Basically, he is concerned about application of the
doctrines in federal cases applying state law where the state's relevant
substantive law has not yet been developed by the state courts.' Absent
a more explicit foundation in state law, he says, "we are left with what
looks like what was decried in Erie and its progeny: an impermissible
species of federal common law, bound to encourage forum-shopping
among litigants.
As previously noted, the days when the doctrines were addressed
almost exclusively by federal courts in diversity cases are becoming a
relic of the past. Increasingly, state appellate courts are evaluating the
doctrines. In any event, to the extent that there is validity to the concern
that federal courts may be a little too creative in their Erie-educated
guesses on future directions in state law, one answer would be to eschew
the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines. The policy
concerns that inspired the doctrines would then be animated by
thoughtful analysis of the elements and damages rules governing
defamation law.

151. It may be at least theoretically possible that the plaintiff's claim might still be barred by
the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, depending on how much harm the other publication hlad already
done to the plaintiff's reputation before the second article, and also on the standing and scop of the
doctrine in the jurisdiction in question. But the court might also have to contend with the "prior

publication" rule. See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
152- See Marder, supranote 27, at 1013-14.
153. See id. One author has taken this tack a step further, even arguing that the doctrines
should be declared unconstitutional on equal protection or due process grounds. See Pcton, supra
note 13, at 198.

154. See Peyton, supra note 13, at 202.
155. See discussion infra Part ILA.
156. See Serra, supra note 28, at 16-17.
157. See id at 18.

158. Id. at 17.
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8. Reputation as a Monolith
Perhaps the most sentient judicial criticism of the doctrines appears
in then-Judge Scalia's opinion in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson.5 " In
rejecting the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, he said: "we cannot envision
how a court would go about determining that someone's reputation had
already been 'irreparably' damaged-i.e., that no new reader could be
reached by the freshest libel. ' '1W And, later, in discussing and rejecting
the incremental harm doctrine, the court explained that "the theory must
be rejected because it rests upon the assumption that one's reputation is a
monolith, which stands or falls in its entirety."'' Another critic asked,
"[w]hat of the criminal who has been rehabilitated and wants to start a
new life?"' 2
Another potential shortcoming of the doctrines is that they operate
on the plaintiffs in sort of a "'kick 'em when they're down""63 way. The
doctrine could "seem unduly harsh ...[in] a society ...committed to
equal justice under law."'64
Thus, some critics have contended that the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine arbitrarily creates an "'outlaw"' class. 65 To these criticisms,
proponents of the doctrines respond that the doctrines should be applied
broadly, and not limited "to murderers and other scoundrels."' This
kind of rejoinder in defense of the doctrines is, however, hardly
reassuring. The fact that the class of persons to be reputationally written
off is (or as the doctrines' proponents argue should be) enlarged, does
not make it any less repugnant. The Social Darwinism inherent in the
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine does not disappear simply by enlarging the
blade of the doctrinal scythe used for winnowing the irrevocably unfit
members of society from the "fittest."' 67
Of the preceding criticisms, the last comes closest to identifying
one of the central flaws in the doctrines-that they are premised on a

159. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying District of Columbia law), vacated on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
160. Id. at 1568.
161. Id.
162. Marder, supra note 27, at 1013.
163. Hemphill, supra note 27, at 430 (noting this potential shortcoming, but rejecting it
because "there is no reason to limit the application of the principles behind the doctrine to
murderers and other scoundrels").
164. Id. (noting this potential shortcoming, but rejecting it).
165. Peyton, supranote 13, at 201.
166. Hemphill, supranote 27, at 430.
167. See discussion infra Part sI.C.
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monolithic view of reputation."f But, the problems with the doctrines go
deeper than that, and relate to the doctrines both structurally as a matter
of substantive defamation law, and philosophically, in terms of their
static and one-dimensional premises and their binary classificatory
methodology. These matters are discussed in the next section.
Im.

ELEMENTS, STAsIS, AND FALSE SIMPLICITY

A.

Thesis

I believe that the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm
doctrines should be eliminated. This thesis is based primarily on tvo
grounds. First, the doctrines have been conceived and applied as standalone, self-contained defenses, operating independently of the traditional
elements, privileges, and damages rules of defamation law."° I believe
that such an approach is ill-advised. If the doctrines could be rationally
integrated into and deemed a part of the elements, then we would simply
not need the two doctrines. They add unnecessary complexity to a field
already shuddering under enormous historical, substantive, and modem
constitutional baggage. Contrariwise, if the libel-proof plaintiff and
incremental harm doctrines cannot be logically conceived Aithin the
elements of defamation law, then we should reexamine the policy
justifications for the doctrines. If they are unsound, the doctrines should
be rejected on that basis. If their ends have some merit, then we should
consider whether the elements and damages rules of defamation law
should be appropriately tailored to better accommodate those policy
ends.
The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines, by
providing easy hooks with which the courts may kill a defamation case,
preempt thoughtful analysis of underlying issues of the nature of
reputational harm, the effect of the plaintiff's preexisting reputation on
his or her claim, and the operation of causation and other elements. The
libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines have done little
more than jostle and obfuscate the elements of defamation law. Any
appropriate clarification and change to the foundational component
elements of defamation law should occur directly and thoughtfully,

168. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 19341. racatcdan
other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
169. See generally RESTATEM2iENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558,583-612. 620-62301977).
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rather than obliquely through some ill-defined and ill-considered
expedients like the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines.
Second, the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines
suffer from several inherent flaws. The first is that the doctrines are
premised on a static view of reputation, and more broadly, on a static
view of human nature. 7 The second flaw is that the doctrines are
premised on a monolithic, rather than a multifaceted concept of
reputation.' And, finally, the doctrines are binary and classificatory in
their operation and methodology.
My two objections to the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm
doctrines are discussed in greater detail below.
B. Return to Core Elements and DamagesRules
The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines have not
been housed in or consistently tied to a single element for defamation.
Sometimes the application of the doctrines seems, to varying degrees, to
overlap with one or more of the elements, especially the falsity and
causation elements. At other times, the doctrines seem more discrete, as
though they occupied some special space' in defamation law, operating
as freestanding defenses seemingly propelled by little more than their
facile nomenclature. These nice-ringing doctrines remind one of Lord
Shaw's observation about res ipsa loquitur, that "[i]f that phrase had not
been in Latin, nobody would have called it a principle.""' The doctrines
seem to waver somewhere between cousins to the elements and separate
defenses, based on a sense that some plaintiffs' preexisting reputations
have crossed some invisible Rubicon beyond which their rights to
pursue the judicial process in protecting their reputations are lost.
A number of elements bear some conceptual similarity to the
doctrines. Moreover, in some cases addressing the doctrines, various
elements have been relied on by the defendants or courts as alternative
doctrinal bases to the libel-proof plaintiff or incremental harm doctrines.
Those elements with the most kinship to the libel-proof plaintiff and
incremental harm doctrines are discussed below. And, it is those
170. See discussion infra Part m.C.
171. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 746 F.2d at 1568.
172. Thus, elusive underpinnings of the doctrines can be seen in the simplistic observation of
one case that "[a] kernel of truth and common sense underlies the libel-proof doctrine[.]" Langston
v. Eagle Publ'g Co., 719 S.W.2d 612, 623 (Tex. App. 1986).
173. Ballard v. N. British Ry. Co., 1923 A.C. 68, 79 (H.L., appeal taken from Scot.) (Lord
Shaw). Lord Shaw continued: "The expression need not be magnified into a legal rule; it simply has
its place in that scheme of and search for causation upon which the mind sets itself working." Id.
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elements that should be considered as the appropriate instruments for

tailoring the foundational contours of the defamation theory of liability.
1. Falsity and Substantial Truth
The falsity of the statement bearing the defamatory sting is an
inherent characteristic of defamation. Moreover, the Constitution

requires that falsity be an element of defamation cases, at least with
respect to matters of public concern. 4 And even when proof of falsity is
not a constitutionally compelled element on which the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof, the truth-or-falsity issue will still be outcome

determinative and fatal to the plaintiff's case if it is determined that the
subject statement was substantially true.'75
There is some similarity between the falsity requirement
(substantial truth defense) and the libel-proof plaintiff"' and incremental
harm doctrines.'" The absence of falsity (or proof of substantial truth)

has sometimes been invoked along with the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine
to support a decision in favor of the defendant in a defamation case."3
174. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,768-69 (1986 .
175. See DOBBS, supra note 25, § 410, at 1147-48.
176. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 7.2(9), at 287.
177. See Daly, supra note 42, at 377, 378 (saying that the incremental harm doctrine is a
"variation" of the substantial truth defense, and that the tests for the rules are "surprisingly
similar"); Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 45, at 9-10; Marder, supra note 27, at 1015; see also
Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1349-51 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Illinois law). In
Desnick, the trial court dismissed the case, holding that the alleged defamatory statement "did not
significantly increase the damage to their reputations inflicted by the parts of the broadcast segment
they do not challenge." Id. at 1350. The court of appeals chooses to address this incremental-harmtype of situation solely in terms of substantial truth, and on that basis, refused to uphold dismissal at
that preliminary stage with the record not suficiently developed. See id. at 1351.
178. See Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 293.299 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New
York law); Fmklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d 51' 518 (Te-L App. 1987); see also
I SACK, supra note 9, § 3.7, at 3-18 n.71 (stating that "[t]he
'incremental harm' and 'substantial
truth' doctrines may be two ways of giving effect to the same idea: that, in light of the valus of free
speech that are implicated, a relatively minor defamatory inaccuracy does not, as a matter of law, do
significant enough damage to the plaintiff's reputation for the law to provide compensation for it");
cf.DeWitt v. Outlet Broad., Inc., No. C.A. NC 98-0196, 1999 WL 1334932, at 024 (R.i. Supzr. CL
Dec. 17, 1999) (involving a case in which the court relied on the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, and
where the defendant had argued in the alternative for a decision based on substantial truth bazed on
"the gist or sting of the publication"). In Guccione, for example, the court held that the plaintiff %as
libel-proof with respect to the statement that the plaintiff "'is married and also has a live-in
girlfriend, Kathy Keeton."' Guccione, 800 F.2d at 299,303-04 (quoting a 1983 issue of Penthouse).
In addition, the court held that "the extremely long duration of Guccione's adulterous conduct.
which he made no attempt to conceal from the general public, and the relatively short period of time
since his divorce--make it fair to say that calling Guccione an 'adulterer' in 1983 was substantially
true." Id. at 302 (quoting a 1983 issue of Penthouse). Interestingly, the Urbano case, one of the
cases relied on in Cardillo (the seminal libel-proof plaintiff case), was affirmed on appeal on
alternative grounds, one of which was that the action would be precluded under the falsity clement.
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Notwithstanding their similarity, the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental

harm doctrines and the falsity requirement (or truth defense) are not,
technically, necessarily coterminous. 7 9 The focus is different."' The

falsity element (or substantial truth defense) looks at the hurtful sting or
gist 8' of the statement, and examines whether it is in fact substantially

true. The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine compares the plaintiff's reputation
before and after the statement." Moreover, while a plaintiff's prior acts
might, if sufficiently notorious, be relevant to the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine, such prior acts and past conduct would not usually be
admissible to establish the truth of a defamatory accusation of other
specific acts of misconduct.' The incremental harm doctrine compares
the effect on the plaintiff's reputation of the nonactionable portion of the
84
publication with the effect of the otherwise actionable portion.
See Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 638, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1975); Urbano v. Sondem,
370 F.2d 13, 14 (2d Cir.), aff'g, 41 F.R.D. 355, 357 (D. Conn. 1966); supra notes 65-67, 130 and
accompanying text. And in the Liberty Lobby, Inc. case (one of the decisions most critical of the
doctrines), although the court rejected the doctrines, it expressly held out the possibility that in some
circumstances the substantial truth rule might operate to preclude liability. See Liberty Lobby, Inc.
v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying District of Columbia law),
vacated on other grounds,477 U.S. 242 (1986).
179. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 393, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(applying New York law in distinguishing the substantial truth idea and incremental harm doctrine
because the former relates to "an element"); Daly, supra note 42, at 377; Kelley & Zansberg, supra
note 45, at 10.
180. See Hemphill, supra note 27, at 427; Kite, supra note 27, at 534-42.
181. See DOBBS, supranote 25, § 410, at 1147.
182. See Hemphill, supra note 27, at 427.
183. See DOBBS, supra note 25, §410, at 1148 (stating that "[i]f the defamation charges
specific conduct, the only admissible evidence of truth is specific evidence of that conduct or
conduct substantially similar and carrying the equivalent sting"). A defendant might tryto rely on
the prior acts of the plaintiff in an attempt to establish substantial truth in two ways, One way would
be to attempt to argue circumstantially that the fact of prior similar acts of misconduct make the
truth of the specific defamatory accusations more likely to have been true. See Sharon v. Time, Inc.,
103 F.R.D. 86, 91-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying New York law in refusing to admit evidence of
prior misconduct as circumstantial evidence to prove the truth of other conduct). See generally
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 186-189, at 649-58 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (discussing
in general the question of the admissibility of evidence of prior character, habit, and acts and
conduct to prove specific conduct for various purposes). The second way would be to attempt to
define the sting of the defamatory statement more broadly so as to encompass the prior acts, so that
by proving them, the truth of the defamatory accusation is concomitantly proven. See, e.g., Sharon,
103 F.R.D. at 93. The admissibility of prior misconduct as direct evidence on the substantial truth
issue would thus depend on the nature of the defamatory accusation and its specificity, as well as on
how broadly the court defined substantial truth.
184. See Jewell, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94 (applying New York law in distinguishing
substantial truth idea and incremental harm, because the former relates to "an element"). The court
in Jewell explained: "Thus, as their names imply, the substantial truth doctrine is concerned with
truth (regardless of harm) and the incremental harm analysis is concerned with harm (regardless of
truth)." Id. at 394.
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Moreover, it is at least theoretically possible, depending on the scope of
the doctrines, that a claim could still be barred by the libel-proof plaintiff
or incremental harm doctrines despite the fact that even the preexisting
or non-actionable information was not substantially true."5
When, however, the preexisting reputation of the plaintiff or the
nonactionable portions of the publication are believed to strongly
militate against recovery by the plaintiff, that concern should be
implemented through the traditional elements of defamation law. And,
with respect to the element of falsity (or defense of substantial truth), the
solution is to realistically define the substantial truth idea broadly in
terms of the sting and gist of the statement, so that many of the cases in
which courts might be tempted to consider the libel-proof plaintiff and
incremental harm doctrines would be amenable to resolution under the
substantial truth concept."6 One court had this to say:
There may be validity to the proposition that at some point the
erroneous attribution of incremental evidence of a character flaw of a
particular type which is in any event amply established by the facts is
not derogatory. If, for example, an individual is said to have been
convicted of 35 burglaries, when the correct number is 34, it is not
likely that the statement is actionable. That is so, however, not because
the object of the remarks is "libel proof," but because, since the

185. See Daly, supra note 42, at 377 (discussing the incremental harm doctrine). Thu-. it is
theoretically possible that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine could still apply %%here the plaintiff's
prior bad reputation was undeserved because the prior conduct he or she was believed to have
committed never occurred. Courts, however, usually do not apply the libal-proof plaintiff dectrine
here and Dobbs argues against its application in this context, at least where "there is room to blieve
that [the plaintiff's] reputation was made worse" or suspicions were intensified. 2 DOBs. supra
note 20, § 7.2(9), at 289. The incremental harm doctrine might apply, at least theoretically, to a falsz
statement where the nonactionable portions of the publication were rendered nonactionable for
reasons other than their truth. This possibility has been one of the targets of critics of the doctrine.
See discussion supra Part ILC.5. One commentator who otherwise approves of the incremental
harm doctrine recommends that it be applied only %%hen the nonactionable statemnts are
nonactionable because they are true. See Hemphill, supra note 27, at 425.
186. See Kelley & Zansberg, supranote 45, at 11. On a broadly defined concept of substantfial
truth that focuses on the sting or the gist of the statement, see Jewell, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 386
(applying New York law in articulating a gist focus that asks %%hetherthe alleg-dly defamatory
statement would have made the reasonable reader react differently than the truth would have);
Funklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.V.2d 512,518 (Tex. App. 1987) tholding, in its third
ground for the decision, that "considering the statements' content and the appellant's record, it is
our opinion ... that he has not been libeled because 'the essentially derogatory implication of the
statement... is correct'" (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986))); 1 SAcK supra note 9. § 3.7, at 3-15
(focusing on the "'sting' or "'gist").
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essentially derogatory implication of the statement ("he is an habitual
burglar") is correct, he has not been libeled. 187

The courts should also consider holding that the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff in all defamation cases, without exception, to prove the
falsity of the statement. This should afford potential defendants
sufficient freedom of expression without the need to resort to the
expedients of the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines."'8
If, notwithstanding a sedulously framed substantial truth concept and the
universal placement of the burden of proof on the plaintiff, the statement

is nevertheless still found to be false, then I would not bar it under either
the libel-proof plaintiff or incremental harm doctrines. But, its validity
would still depend on whether the statement could satisfy the remaining
elements and defenses applicable to defamation, the clarification of
some of which are suggested below. Additionally, the amount of
damages might also be influenced by the state of the plaintiffs
preexisting reputation.
2. Causation and Damages

The requirement of causation in defamation has always been
clouded by uncertainty over exactly what it is that must have been
187. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 746 F.2d at 1568-69 n.6 (applying District of Columbia law).
188. For examples of cases applying a broadly conceived substantial truth concept, see, for
example, Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Illinois
law); Koniak v. Heritage Newspapers, Inc., 499 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied,
508 N.W.2d 500 (Mich. 1993). In Haynes, a book had stated that the plaintiff had left his children
alone at night when he was supposed to be watching them and that he spent money on a car that he
should have used to buy shoes for his children. See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1225. In affirming a summary
judgment for the defendants, the court held that the statements were substantially true. See id. at
1227. The court relied on the facts that the plaintiff had walked out on his wife and four children
and had repeatedly flouted child support orders, as well as on other unspecified, but "uncontested
facts" in the book. See id. at 1227-28. The facts relied upon, however, did not relate specifically to
the conduct detailed by the plaintiff. See id. at 1228. The court reasoned that when compared to the
unchallenged facts, the alleged falsehoods paled and would not "have altered the picture that the
true facts paint." Id. In Haynes, the substantial truth concept was instrument enough for the court
without need to invoke the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines. See id. In Koniak,
an article said that the plaintiff had allegedly sexually assaulted his stepdaughter thirty to fifty times,
when she had testified that he had "assaulted her only eight times." Koniak, 499 N.W.2d at 348. In
affirming a summary judgment for the defendant, the court found that the article "was close enough
to the truth about the nature of the criminal sexual conduct charges to justify summary disposition."
Id. The court added, "whether plaintiff assaulted his stepdaughter once, eight times, or thirty times
would have little effect on the reader." Id. The substantial truth idea was an adequate mechanism to
deal with a claim by a plaintiff accused by his stepdaughter of sexual assault when that plaintiff
sought to sift through an article in hope of parsing out of such a setting a neatly mathematical
defamatory falsehood. See id.
189. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
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caused by the defendant's false statement, and how that harm must be
proven.9 Part of the confusion stems from a tendency of two questions

to become commingled. One is whether or to what extent there is a
threshold element that some harm be proven without which the plaintiff
cannot pursue his or her claim at all."'9 This is a question regarding the
nature of the keys to the multi-lock treasure room that houses the

damages sought by the plaintiff. The other question relates to the amount
of damages to which the plaintiff may be entitled once all of the
elements have been established.' 92 In other words, the question here is
how much treasure the plaintiff will be entitled to cart off after he or she
has unlocked the door by satisfying all the elements.

In some states proof of special damages is a required element
especially for some types of slander."3 Apart from a special damages
requirement, when applicable, matters become more abstruse. Unlike
negligence law generally, nominal damages were recoverable in
defamation cases."9 Moreover, at common law, the plaintiff in a
defamation case was entitled to recover presumed damages.' The
Supreme Court has, to some extent, restricted presumed and punitive

(and perhaps nominal) damages by precluding the states from awarding
them in cases involving matters of public concern, at least in the absence
of proof that defendant acted with knowledge or reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity. 96 The Court held that the Constitution also requires
that in matters of public concern97 the states limit recovery to "actual"

injury, at least in the absence of proof that the defendant acted with

190. See generally infra Part IILB.2.a.
191. See generally RESTATEENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 558(1977).
192. See generally id. §§ 620-623.
193. See I SACK, supranote 9, § 10.3.2, at 10-8.
194. See LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAw OF DEFAMATION § 95. at 539 (1978); Hemphill.
supranote 27, at 405; Katz, supra note 27, at 1259.
195. See RESTATEM EN (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (stating that "falt common la,
general damages have traditionally been awarded not only for harm to reputation that is proved to
have occurred, but also, in the absence of this proof, for harm to reputation that would normally be
assumed to flow from a defamatory publication of the nature involved"); 2 DOBBs. supra no:a 20,
§ 7.2(3), at 270; ELDREDGE, supra note 194, § 95. at 537; Anderson. supra note 128, at 748.
Presumed damages were recoverable at common law, hoever, only if the statements ,exe
actionable per se (without the need to prove) or spe:cial damages %-ere proven, and, of cours., the
applicable elements were established. See RESTATF-MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 emt. b
(defining the phrase '"actionable per se"'); 1 SLADE R. METCALF & LEO.NARD M. NIEHOFF, RIGuiTS
AND LtABLIs OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND REPORTERS § 1.74. at 1-170 (1999);
Anderson, supranote 128, at 748.
196. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755, 763 (1985);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,342(1974).
197. See Dun & Bradstreet,Inc., 472 U.S. at 761; DoBBS, supranote 25, § 42. at 1190.
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knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard with respect to whether
the statement was true or false.9 ' This actual-injury limitation seems to
fall short of effectively circumscribing damages in defamation cases in
several respects. The actual injury limitation on the states does not apply
when the defendant acted with knowledge or reckless disregard whether
the statement was true or false. 99 Furthermore, the limitation does not
apply to statements involving matters of private (as opposed to public)
concern.2" And finally, the force of the actual injury limitation is diluted
and complicated not only by the fact that actual injury may include
"personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering," '' but also
from the fact that the Court has said that the states may, if they choose,
award such mental distress damages even in the absence of proof of
some objectively discernible evidence of diminished reputation.2 2
The courts should clarify whether, apart from a special damages
element (where applicable), there is any other threshold element
requiring proof of some actual reputational harm as a prerequisite to
pursuing the claim, and if so, by what test of causation it must be
established.
A second question relates to the amount of damages, and how they
must be proven. Clearly, to the extent that the plaintiff claims that some
specific economic loss-such as loss of customers or clients-is
attributable to the defamation, the plaintiff must establish that the
statement caused that loss.2"° The plaintiff seeking to recover for mental
distress must also prove that such distress was caused by the defamatory
statement,2 except perhaps to the extent that such damages were
encompassed within presumed damages when available.20' The
availability of presumed and nominal damages also needs to be clarified.
The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines bear some
kinship to both the causation element2 6 and damages rules."' Indeed,
198. See Dun & Bradstreet,Inc., 472 U.S. at 755; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.

199. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
200. See Dun & Bradstreet,Inc., 472 U.S. at 759.

201. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
202. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,460 (1976).
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 622A (1977).
204. See id. § 623.
205. See id. § 623 cmt. b.
206. See 1 SACK, supra note 9, § 2,4.18, at 2-62 (describing the doctrines as "tools" or means
of "ensur[ing] that only when there is an established, concrete relationship among error, fault, and
harm to the plaintiff may the plaintiff pursue a remedy in defamation"); Daly, supra note 42, at 372
(describing operation of the incremental harm doctrine as being especially a matter of causation,
saying that "[i]f the defendant can show that the publication would have had exactly the same effect
on the plaintiffs reputation had the challenged portion been excised, then the incremental harm
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some of the cases discussing the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental

harm doctrines describe them in causation terms. : ' Thus, in one recent
case the court explained that the reason a libel-proof plaintiff cannot
recover is that he or she "cannot be harmed because the plaintiff's

reputation has already been so damaged that further falsehoods do not
cause any additional damage." And with respect to the incremental
harm doctrine, the same court identified the doctrine's roots as follows:
"otherwise actionable statements are dismissed because there is no
benefit, and indeed only detriment, in proceeding with them when the
harm which flows therefrom is virtually ... the same as the harm that

flows from non-actionable statements."2 0 Some courts have also invoked
the causation requirement as an alternative holding in addition to one of
the doctrines. 2 ' A few courts have addressed the doctrines in the context
defense compels judgment for the defendant"); Serra, supra note 28. at 13 noting the similarity of
both doctrines to causation); Note, supra note 27. at 1909 (describing the %%hole area as '-th2
problem of libel plaintiffs who challenge published statements that do not in fact dama ge their
already sullied reputations").
207. See Fmlea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress. 742 S.W.2d 512. 517 Temt. App. 19S7
(stating that "[tihe libel proof plaintiff doctrine is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the
principle underlying that rule" and "that the plaintiff's tarnished reputation may bz shovm in
mitigation of damages").
20S. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ammay Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 639. 662 (S.D. Tct. 1999)
(applying Texas law in approving the doctrine in principle, stating that "'xhere there is no
reputation it cannot be damage[d] and without damage to reputation there is no actionable
defamation,"' but finding that the defendant did not prove that the plaintiff vas lib.l-preof herel
(quoting Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 517) (alteration in orginal); Jewyeli v. NYP Holdings, Inc.. 23
F. Supp. 2d 348, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying New York law in explaining that the reason a libelproof plaintiff cannot recover is that he "cannot be harmed because the plaintiff's reputation has
already been so damaged that further falsehoods do not cause any additional damage," but finding
that the doctrine was inapplicable in the instant case); Jones v. Globe Int'l, Inc., No. 3:94:CV01463,
1995 WL 819177, at *1l (D. Conn. Sept. 26, 1995) (applying Connecticut law in stating that since
"[t]he true facts surrounding the plaintiff's criminal conviction along vith the unchallenged
statements in the articles at issue, had a devastating impact upon the plaintiff's reputation" and
therefore "[t]he plaintiff has failed to prove that the remaining statements caused him to suffer any
further injury"); Tonnessen v. Denver Publ'g Co., 5 P.3d 959, 965 IColo. Ct. App. 2001
(explaining that an otherwise actionable statement is not actionable sshere -it caufes no harm
beyond" that produced by unchallenged or nonactionable parts of the publication); Gannett Co. v.
Re, 496 A.2d 553, 558 (Del. 1985) (recognizing incremental harm doctrine in principle, but finding
it inapplicable because at least ajury question was presented as to %%hetherthe allegedy actionable
statement "caused the real damage to [plaintiff's] reputation"); Brite Metal Treating, Inc. v, Schuler.
No. 62360, 1993 WL 158256, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 13, 1993) (stating that "if the quo:ed
statement of [the defendant] was excised from the ... article, the opprobrium and humiliation
caused the plaintiff. ., would have been no less").
209. Jewell, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (applying New York law).
210. Id. at 388 n.27 (applying New York law).
211. See Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328. 1332 (D.D.C. 19781 (apparently
applying District of Columbia law). The court in Logan decided the case on causation grouns,.
stating that "the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the articles caused any injury to his reputatton.
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of causation and a special damages requirement, suggesting the doctrines
might operate to preclude a finding of special damages, a threshold
element for some types of defamation in some states.1 2
Part of the attraction of the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental
harm doctrines, and one of the reasons why some courts do not rely on a
straightforward causation analysis instead of these expedients, may be
due to uncertainty over exactly what it is that defamation plaintiffs must
prove was caused by the defendant's statement.21 Specifically, there has

perhaps been an unspoken concern that relying on causation
requirements might not end lawsuits by otherwise libel-proof or

incrementally harmed plaintiffs. 24 This concern may be based on

possible awards of presumed,215 nominal,"' punitive,2" and mental
Id. Then, alternatively the court also held on the basis of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine that the
plaintiff "will be found 'libel-proof' as a matter of law." Id. The libel-proof plaintiff language in
Logan seemed to be invoked almost as an afterthought. In any event, the court's reliance on
causation grounds seems prescient since the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine was later repudiated by
Liberty Lobby, Inc. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(applying District of Columbia law), vacated on other grounds,477 U.S. 242 (1986); supra notes
159-62 and accompanying text. The causation analysis, however, would presumably still be
available after Liberty Lobby, Inc., and would produce a more thoughtful analysis in any event.
212. See Jones, 1995 WL 819177, at *9, *9 n.20 (applying Connecticut law in employing the
incremental harm doctrine and stating that the remaining portions of the publication were not
actionable "because the true portions of [these publications] ha[d] such damaging effects" that the
plaintiff had failed to prove the requisite special damages necessary in order to recover for libel);
Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F. Supp. 906, 915 n.7 (D. Haw. 1993) (applying Hawaii law in impliedly
approving the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in principle and seemingly tying it to a special damages
requirement), af'd,56 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1995).
213. See generally Anderson, supra note 128, at 748-65.
214. See generally id. at 764-65.
215. Courts have invented "convoluted theories to avoid the doctrine of presumed harm." Id. at
750. The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines may be examples of this. Cf. Kurth v.
Great Falls Tribune Co., 1998 MT 178N,
12, 977 P.2d 342 (unpublished table decision)
(addressing the issue of whether a defamatory statement that plaintiff-attorney had nine criminal
charges pending caused harm to his professional reputation). In Kurth, the trial court found that by
the time of the publication of the article, the plaintiff "was already 'financially beleaguered' due to
the way he conducted his practice. Id. 1 27. Thus, the article was not a cause of the decline in the
plaintiff's income and professional reputation. But, interestingly, while affirming the trial court's
finding of an absence of proof of causation, the supreme court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's
award of presumed damages to the plaintiff. See id. U 12, 31.
216. There remains a question whether, as a matter of substantive tort law, nominal damages
should be recoverable at all in the absence of proof of actual injury, and also whether such nominal
damages would be constitutionally permissible in such a case if otherwise subject to the
constitutional actual injury limitation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. c (1977)
(stating that "[tihe constitutionality of'allowing nominal damages under some circumstances "even
in the absence of proof of [actual] harm to reputation, is now somewhat uncertain"); id. § 620 cmt. c
(stating that to the extent that special damages are not required by state law, the defendant may,
under common law principles, be liable for at least nominal damages, although the constitutionality
of "nominal damages when there is no proof of some actual injury ...remains in some doubt"); 1
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distress damages, for which it was (and perhaps remains) unclear to the
extent that proof that the defamatory falsehood actually caused provable
adverse effects on the plaintiff's reputation was required. Whereas, the
application of the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines
may offer closure, at least according to some courts.1 8
The problem is that using the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental
harm doctrines to end-run the causation element short-circuits thoughtful
analysis of how the plaintiff's preexisting reputation and nonactionable
statements should figure into the defamation equation. What is needed
SAcK, supra note 9, § 10.3.1, at 10-5 (saying common law provides -that even if a plaintiff is not
injured by a defamatory publication, he or she is nonetheless entitled to nominal damages!).
217. If nominals are recoverable even in the absence of proof of some actual injury, this raiscs
the concern that they might be used, depending on state law. to anchor claims for punitive damages
(at least if the requisite state of mind required by state and constitutional law for matters of public
concern is established). Of course, the right to punitives would also dep-nd on %%
hther state law
permitted the award of punitive damages in a case when the plaintiff is otherwise entitled to only
nominal damages, a question about which there is some confusion and uncertainty. See 2 DOBBS.
supra note 20, § 3.11(10), at 513; Marder, supra note 27, at 1007 (referring to the general rule
which allows punitive damages even when only nominal damages have been suffered). Tlhere is
some uncertainty on whether punitive damages can constitutionally be awarded in such
circumstances. See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511, 1519 (D.NJ. 19861
(applying New Jersey law), rev'don other grounds,847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988). In Schiavone, the
district court and court of appeals both suggested a division of authority on whether nominal and
punitive damages could constitutionally be awarded without a finding of "compensable" damuge.
Schia'one, 646 F. Supp. at 1519; Schiavone, 847 F.2d at 1032. 1082 n.19 (referring to the question
as a "constitutional minefield"). The district court addressed that question, holding "as a matter of
federal constitutional law, that" the plaintiff could not maintain an action for purely nominal and
punitive damages "absent a sho\ving of compensable injury:' See Schiavone, 646 F. Supp. at 1520.
And, the plaintiff in the instant case could not, according to the district court, prove such injury to
reputation because that court held that the plaintiff was libel-proof. See id. at 1515. The court of
appeals, however, held that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine did not apply under the facts precented
and therefore it did not have to reach the question of the availability of nominal and punitive
damages absent a showing of compensable injury to reputation. See Schiavone, 847 F.2d at 1032.
Most courts have held that application of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine ends the claim and thus
obviates the need to decide the questions of the availability of punitive damages. See Schiavone, 646
F. Supp. at 1520 (citing cases). But the court of appeals interestingly chose not to "confront the
secondary issue posed by the libel proof plaintiff doctrine of whether plaintiffs, if they were found
to be libel proof as a matter of law, could nevertheless seek punitive damages." Sehiavone, 847 F.2d
at 1081 n.17.
218. See Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New
York law in applying the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and stating that the plaintiff was not even
entitled to a nominal damages award); Schiavone, 646 F. Supp. at 1519; Jackson v. Longeop, 476
N.E.2d 617, 619 (Mass. 1985) (holding that irre-pective of whether someone is entitleJ to nominal
damages in the absence of proof of actual harm, he or she is not entitled to nominal damages %hen
the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine applies); 2 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 7.2(9), at 286 (stating that the
libel-proof plaintiff "rule refuses to allow even nominal damages"). Interestingly, perhaps as a
caveat, the court of appeals in Schiavone chose not to "confront the secondary issue posed by the
libel proof plaintiff doctrine of whether plaintiffs, if they were found to be libel proof as a matter of
law, could nevertheless seek punitive damages." Schiavone, 847 F.2d at 1081 n.17.
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here is not the creation of two new doctrines, but rather delineation of
the causation and damages principles that should govern all defamation
claims. I will attempt to briefly identify some of the causation and
damages issues that seem in need of some analysis.
a. Identifying the Interest Protected
The courts should address the nature of the interest protected by
defamation. This step is an essential prelude to any sensible resolution of
situations commonly decided under the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine.
What is encompassed within the protected interest known as
"reputation?" The courts should decide how a plaintiffs preexisting
standing should affect his or her defamation claim. Use of the libel-proof
plaintiff construct does not facilitate analysis. The preexisting reputation
of the plaintiff may be relevant to the damages question, depending on
precisely how the plaintiff is claiming he or she was harmed by the
statement. But the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine treats the plaintiff's
preexisting reputation in all-or-nothing terms."1 9 This can be seen in the
way one proponent of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine illustrates its
operation. He characterizes the plaintiff's prior reputation as a wall with
a hole caused by prior damage to his or her reputation, 2 Then, the test
is, simply put, whether the subsequent alleged defamation passes
through the prior hole "thus causing no additional reputational harm ...
or ... was sufficiently different in kind or degree ... to either create a
new hole or enlarge the bounds of the first.""' If it were only that simple.
Reputations are not concrete walls, but intangible, dynamic, and
polycentric, making such illustrations metaphorical wishful thinking.
Plaintiff's preexisting condition should not operate as a binary all-ornothing proposition. Reputation can only exist in the eyes of the
beholders, and therefore is constantly changing, as are the many facets
that comprise the plaintiff's character. Aside from economic losses,
"reputational harm is intangible."' Reputations are not quantifiable into

219. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying
New York law in explaining that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is based on the idea that the
plaintiff "cannot be harmed because the plaintiffs reputation has already been so damaged that
further falsehoods do not cause any additional damage").
220. See Hemphill, supranote 27, at 426.
221. Id.
222. 2 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 7.2(7), at 280.
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neat composite scores. They are not monolithic,2

but polycentric and

multifaceted. They are not static, but dynamic.
The courts should also decisively confront the question of
presumed damages. Specifically, they should consider adopting a
universal threshold requirement of proof of some actual injury to

reputation, one manifested by some discernible adverse effect on the
plaintiff s relationships.f 4 Professor David Anderson has made a
thoughtful case for abolishing the doctrine of presumed damages.

After identifying the evils of presumed damages in defamation, Anderson proposed a threshold requirement of proof of actual harm to at

least one of three types of relational interests: harm to existing relations,
harm to an existing favorable public image, or creation of a negative
public image for a plaintiff who previously had no public image.' Only
then, if that threshold was satisfied, would the plaintiff be entitled to
seek damages, if proven, for harm to future relations and for mental

anguish.' The process of reform could be facilitated if the Supreme
Court would overrule Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.,' and extend the constitutional requirement for proof of actual
injury to all cases, and would more narrowly define the actual injury
requirement in a more limited way that is similar to Professor

Anderson's thesis.
The courts should also clarify how a person's preexisting reputation
should be considered in mitigation of damages. Most authorities agree
223. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563. 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1934) Japplying
District of Columbia law in stating that "the theory must be rejected because it rests upn the,
assumption that one's reputation is a monolith, which stands or falls in its entirety"). vacated on
other grounds,477 U.S. 242 (1986).
224. See Anderson, supranote 128, at 758,767-71; Note. supra note 27, at 1915 n.39.
225. See Anderson, supranote 128, at 758,767-71.
226. Anderson complains that presumed damages have no standards, are "inherently
irrational," create a temptation to consider impermissible factors, prompt courts to invent
convoluted theories to avoid them, result in abstract evaluation of claims based on vhether the
defamation was of a kind that would tend to harm. permit recovery unrelated to the interest of
protecting the reputation of the particular individual, diminish the court's control over the size of
jury verdicts, and generate mystify'ing evidentiary rules. See Anderson. supra note 128, at 749-53.
227. See id. at 765-67. The threshold requirement could be satisfied by any "tp4[ of
demonstrable harm to existing relations" in the form of either pecuniary relational losses (such as
"[loss of a specific job, contract, or client") or nonpecuniary relational losses ("such as desertion by
a spouse, the estrangement of a child or parent, loss of friends.... any other deterioration of an
existing relationship," or denial of "membership in social or professional organizations"). Id. at 767,
769. The possibility of future relational harm would not alone satisfy the threshold requirement, but
such harm would be compensable once the plaintiff had proven injury to the existing relationship
(and the other elements). See id.
228. Seeid. at769-71.
229. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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that the fact that the plaintiff had a preexisting poor reputation may be
considered in mitigation of damages," or at least that those aspects of
his or her prior reputation that are affected by the defamation may be
considered."' Thus, in one recent case, the plaintiff sued for allegedly
being induced to portray herself as a teenage prostitute (and as such,
libeled) on the Sally Jessy Raphael Show.32 The court held that "[i]f
plaintiff's reputation was disreputable before the purported defamatory
statements were uttered, because she had been known for having casual
sex with strangers, in exchange for money, drugs or otherwise, this
information is clearly relevant to mitigation of damages." 33 As Professor

Dan Dobbs has said, "[t]he plaintiffs reputation, as it stood before the
publication of defamatory material, is the bench mark from which

reputational loss must be estimated."' - The courts should clarify whether
it is the plaintiff's general reputation that is admissible, and also whether

230. See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir.
1985) (applying Pennsylvania law in stating that "[e]vidence of a tarnished reputation is admissible
and should be considered as a factor to mitigate the level of compensatory damages"); Weber v.
Multimedia Entm't, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 0682 PKL THK, 1997 WL 729039, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24,
1997); Finklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. App. 1987) (referring to
the rule "that the plaintiff's tarnished reputation may be shown in mitigation of damages");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmt. c (1977) (stating that the fact that the recipient of
the communication "has already heard [a] similar statement[] from other sources ... is to be taken
into account in determining the damages recoverable for the harm to the reputation of the person
defamed"); 2 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 7.2(9), at 284 (stating that "[t]he plaintiff's prior bad
reputation" may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of damages); 1 SACK, supra note 9,
§ 10.5.5.2, at 10-48 (stating that "[tihe fact that the plaintiff already had a bad reputation tends to
show that his or her reputation has not been substantially affected by additional derogatory
communication"); Hemphill, supranote 27, at 405 n.38 (observing that "[diefendants in defamation
actions have long been able to introduce evidence of the plaintiffs previous bad reputation in an
effort to mitigate damages"). Professor Anderson would also use this mitigation principle to
mitigate mental distress damages. He comments: "On the theory that a person of good character is
more likely to suffer genuine anguish from an accusation of misconduct than a person who is guilty,
the court should permit the defendant to demonstrate prior acts of misconduct by a plaintiff who
seeks recovery for mental anguish." Anderson, supranote 128, at 772.
231. See Gosden v. Louis, 687 N.E.2d 481, 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing the rule on
mitigating damages in principle but holding that it was error to admit such evidence in the instant
case, and noting that in order to mitigate damages based on prior reputation, the mitigating evidence
must "pertain[ to the same aspects of the plaintiff's reputation as are alleged to have been damaged
by the defamatory matter" and the subject character traits must have been "known by others in the
community"); DOBBS, supra note 25, § 410, at 1150. Eldredge states "that the defendant may offer
evidence of general bad reputation or bad character," and general bad reputation of the plaintiff "for
the particular thing ... charged." ELDREDGE, supra note 194, § 97, at 564, 566. But he suggests,
that "'evidence of particular and separate departments of character' should not be allowed. Id.
§ 97, at 564-65 (quoting Steinman v. McWilliams, 6 Pa. 170, 175 (1847)).
232. See Weber, 1997 WL 729039, at *1.
233. Id. at *2.
234. 2 DOBBS, supranote 20, § 7.2(9), at 284.
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evidence regarding specific aspects and characteristics of the plaintiff's
preexisting reputation are admissible and the extent to which they must
relate to those characteristics impugned by the alleged defamation.
The straightforward-appearing rule allowing evidence of prior
reputation in mitigation of damages, like so much in defamation lore,
has been complicated by other "rules." Thus, there is a rule occasionally
mentioned to the effect that the mere fact of prior publication of the
negative information should not be admissible.2" This obscure rule, on
which it has been said, "the picture clouds," ' seems difficult to
reconcile with the general rule allowing mitigation of damages based on
prior reputation. Dobbs tries, referring to the rule against admission of
prior publications, then saying "but if the plaintiff's prior reputation can
be established independent of that publication, it would be admissible
under the general rule." 7
Another related issue that deserves clarification involves the
situation in which the plaintiff has committed prior acts of misconduct.
The question is what effect, if any, those prior misdeeds should have on
the plaintiff's defamation claim. In general, the prior acts of misconduct
would ordinarily not serve to establish substantial truth where the
alleged defamation consisted of imputation of other specific misdeeds to
the plaintiff.:" Additionally, evidence of plaintiff's prior misdeeds would
not seem to support mitigation of damages based on the plaintiff's prior
reputation, unless those misdeeds had become sufficiently well known to
be deemed a part of the plaintiffs reputation and were sufficiently
related to the particular characteristic described in the defamatory
statement."9 Nevertheless, some commentators allude to a rule to the
235. See id. § 7.2(9), at 286 (stating that most of the limited authority on point "holds that

evidence of prior publication itself is inadmissible to mitigate damages"); 2 S.%IOLLA, supra note 19,
§ 9:62, at 9-44.1 (stating as an "established rule... that damages may not be mitigated by proof that

the defamatory statement had already been published or in general circulation prior to the
publication"); Anderson, supra note 128, at 754 (referring to the rule that "precludes a dzfendant
from showing that the libel w.as already in circulation"); Kelley & Zansbarg, supra note 45, at 9

(referring to the rule as an "anachronism [that] is routinely ignored by modem judges %,
ho require
plaintiffs to prove and permit defendants to disprove that the wrong caused the damages claimzd").
The rationale for this supposed rule is also obscure. Professor Anderson speculates that perhaps
prior-publication evidence is excluded "on the theory that segregating the harm from different
sources is too difficult." Anderson, supra note 128, at 754.
236. 2 DOBBS, supranote 20, § 7.2(9), at 285.

237. Id. § 7.2(9), at 290.
238. See supranotes 182-85 and accompanying text.

239. See DOBBS, supra note 25, § 410, at 1149-50 (noting that "evidence of the plaintiff's
conduct on specific occasions would not be admissible, but evidence of the plaintiff's general
reputation would be admissible, at least aspects of reputation affecled by the defaniltionit;
1 McCoIRmcK, supra note 183, § 187, at 651 n.1 (noting that "Irleputation (not ch.razter) com.s
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effect that even apart from a substantial truth argument or mitigation
based on prior reputation, damages should be reduced when, "had the
truth been published instead of the false charge, the plaintiffs reputation
would also have been injured."' 0 This supposed rule does not make
sense because the "truth" to which it refers is not the truth of the
defamatory statement, but other truths about the plaintiff. Of the few
authorities to address the question, most seem to reject such a rule, and
would not allow evidence of prior misconduct for the purposes of
mitigating damages, unless it was sufficiently related to and a relevant
part of the plaintiff's actual reputation to justify mitigating damages.!4

into issue when defendant seeks to mitigate damages by showing that plaintiff's reputation was
bad," but that "[slpecific acts may not be used to make this showing"); 2 SMOLLA, supra note 19,
§ 9:60, at 9-41 (stating that "[sipecific prior acts of misconduct by the defendant concerning actions
unrelated to the defamatory charges are traditionally not admissible in mitigation of damages").
240. 1 SACK, supra note 9, § 10.5.5.1, at 10-48 & n.230 (citing several cases); see also Lawlor
v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721, 734 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (applying New
York law); cf. Fulani v. N.Y. Times Co., 686 N.Y.S.2d 703, 703 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that a
statement was not actionable where it "could not have had a different or worse effect on the mind of
a reasonable reader than the truth"). But see 1SACK, supra note 9, § 10.5.5.2, at 10-49 n.236, 10-50.
241. See Gobin v. Globe Publ'g Co., 620 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Kan. 1980) (stating that "specific
acts of misconduct, would not establish reputation"); Gosden v. Louis, 687 N.E.2d 481, 494-95
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Shirley v. Freunscht, 735 P.2d 600, 603 (Or. 1987) (stating that "[sipecifie
instances of plaintiff's prior business misconduct have no relevance to his reputation unless they
were generally known in the business community"); Towle v. St. Albans Publ'g Co., 165 A.2d 363,
366 (Vt. 1960); DOBBS, supra note 25, § 410, at 1149 (rejecting the argument that the statement
"generate[d] no more opprobrium or distaste in readers' minds than the truth," reasoning that a
substantial truth finding would not be supportable unless the statement and the truth were
substantially similar, and the truth about the plaintiff would not be admissible to reduce damages
unless the true facts about the plaintiff were similar to the defendant's charges and, presumably, had
become sufficiently known to be associated with the plaintiff as part of his reputation); cf. Maguire
v. Journal Sentinel, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 881, 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting the defendant's
argument that substantial truth could be established by proof that had it "printed the whole truth,"
the plaintiff would have been seen in a worse light than as portrayed), appeal denied, 2000 WI 36,
612 N.W.2d 732. But see Schafer v. Time, Inc., 142 F.3d 1361, 1372 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying
Georgia law in permitting admission of evidence regarding specific instances of plaintiff's conduct
on the issue of whether plaintiff's reputation was harmed), See generally 1 MCCoRMICK, supra note
183, §§ 186-189, 195 (discussing in general the question of the admissibility of evidence of prior
character, habit, acts, and conduct to prove specific conduct for various purposes). In Maguire, the
plaintiff's claim was based on a newspaper story reporting that the plaintiff had assaulted her cxhusband. See Maguire, 605 N.W.2d at 889. The defendant argued that it "could have printed the
facts pertaining to true instances where [the plaintiff] 'verbally assaulted' [her former husband),
where she grabbed his coat, where she dumped baptismal water on him, and where she embraced
him against his will," in order to (presumably) either prove substantial truth or support the libelproof plaintiff doctrine. Id. at 888. In rejecting the argument, the court seemed to vacillate among
several doctrines in addressing this type of argument. They included substantial truth, the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine (which the court mislabeled as the incremental harm doctrine), and a truth-wouldbe-worse type rule. See id. The court rejected the defendant's argument, noting simply that the court
was "unwilling to stretch the substantial truth doctrine this far." Id.
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Perhaps the most sensible approach to evidence of prior misconduct
would be similar to the one I propose for dealing with the libel-proof
plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines. Evidence of the plaintiff's prior
misconduct would be allowed only to the extent that it is relevant to an
element of defamation, such as the state of mind requirement, or
relates to the plaintiff's actual established preexisting reputation.
Otherwise, evidence of prior misdeeds should ordinarily be
inadmissible.
b. Test for Causation
The courts should also clearly delineate and explain the test for
causationin defamation cases. This is especially important for providing
a sensible framework for deciding cases arising from publications with
similar actionable and nonactionable statements in the same publication,
situations sometimes analyzed under the incremental harm expedient.!43
Causation in personal injury cases generally has been based on a
so-called "but for" (or "sine qua non") test.!" Under this test, causation
requires that the injury would not have occurred "but for" the
defendant's tortious conduct.24' There has been a notable exception to
this test, however, in the situation best illustrated by the two-fires
paradigm. In the classic example, there are two fires, one set by the
defendant and one of other origin, that converge before destroying the
plaintiff's property.2 46 Although a literal "but for" test of causation will
not work her' 7-- the property would have been destroyed even without
the defendant's fire-causation may still be found in this type of
situation if under an alternative test either fire alone was deemed "a
substantial factor" in producing the harm.!" This alternative construct

242. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
243. See Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298,310 (2d Cir. 1986).
244. See DOBBS, supra note 25, § 168, at 409. See generally ARNO C. BECr & FRAN!n W.
MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGuGENCE AND STRICT LIABILIy CA ES 13-21

(1961) (discussing background on the tests of causation).
245. See DOBBS, supranote 25, § 168, at 409; Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and
Chance in PersonalInjury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90
YAIELJ. 1353, 1355 (1981).
246. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 432 illus. 4 (1965).
247. See DOBBS, supranote 25, § 171, at414.
248. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2). In general, the substantial factor test of

causation was conceived to operate interstitially in situations in %hich a literal "but for' test daes
not work very well, "particularly when two independent causes concur to produce an injury that
either of them alone could have produced." Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co.. 15 S.W.3d
425,431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
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' situation
used in the "duplicative causation"249
is commonly referred to
0
as the "substantial factor" test.2 According to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts ("Restatement"), the defendant's conduct may be a substantial

factor (and thus a cause) if it would have alone been sufficient to
produce the outcome' and essentially is not found to have been too
insignificant
or diluted in effect when compared to the other contributing
2
factors.2
The law has been unclear not only on the scope of the causation
requirement in defamation cases generally, but also on the controlling
test for causation. Although the "but for" test seems to be the test that

would apply in a typical defamation case,

3

the possibility that a

substantial factor test might be appropriate in the defamation equivalent

of the two-fires situation has been approved or at least acknowledged
in some defamation cases.2l And indeed, the Restatement has alluded to

its potential application in defamation." 6 A few slander of title" or
249. The "duplicative causation" terminology has been attributed by Dobbs to Richard W.
Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1791 (1985). See DOBBS, supra note 25,
§ 171, at415 nA.
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 431-433; DOBBS, supra note 25, § 171, at 415.
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 432(2).
252. See id. § 433 cmt. d.
253. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 7.2(7), at 279, § 7.2(9), at 284 (referring to the requirement
of "show[ing] that defamation is a but-for cause of reputational harm," in discussing the "but for"
test as the general rule except for presumed damages).
254. See Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 543 A.2d 313, 329-30 (Del. Super. Ct
1987) (applying a "substantial factor" test of causation to special harm requirement, citing sections
431 and 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
255. See Kurth v. Great Falls Tribune Co., 1998 MT 178N, U 27-30, 977 P.2d 342
(unpublished table decision). In Kurth, the issue was whether an allegedly defamatory statement
(that plaintiff-attorney had nine criminal charges pending) caused harm to his professional
reputation. See id. 7. The trial court found that by the time of the publication of the article, the
plaintiff "was already 'financially beleaguered,"' id. 27, due to the way he conducted his practice.
See id. 12. Thus, the article was not a cause of the decline in the plaintiff's income and
professional reputation. See id. The supreme court affirmed. See id. 32. It seemed to straddle both
a preexisting condition analysis-that the harm to the plaintiff's reputation had already occurredand a causation analysis-that the article did not cause the decline in the plaintiff's income and
harm to the plaintiff's professional reputation. See id. U 26-30. The "already" language suggests the
former, while later the court expressly used causation language. See id. The court was noncommittal
on whether a substantial factor test of causation (as compared to a "but for" test, presumably) should
be adopted for defamation. See id. Instead, the court assumed arguendo that a substantial factor test
would be applied, and said in any event there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
decision that the article "was [not] a substantial factor in bringing about [his] damage or injury." Id.

129.
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 622A cmt. b (1977) (noting use of the
substantial factor test of causation for the proof of special harm when required).
257. See GKC Mich. Theaters, Inc. v. Grand Mall, 564 N.W.2d 117, 118 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997), appeal denied, 586 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. 1998). The plaintiff brought a slander of title claim,
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product disparagement" cases have approved the potential application
of the substantial factor test, perhaps paving the way for its adoption in
defamation cases.

The incremental harm doctrine may be, in its effect, a repudiation
of the substantial factor test. The incremental harm doctrine seems

essentially to mandate a "but for" test of causation when a publication
contains similar actionable and nonactionable statements and the

actionable statements do not appear to have added further injury to that
harm attributable to the nonactionable statements.2 ) Thus, one
commentator articulates the incremental harm doctrine in a way that is
tantamount to a but for test, stating "that a libel plaintiff's reputation
before and after the challenged statement should be compared ...[and

i]f the reputation after the statement is no worse than it was before the
statement, no libel action should lie."0 There may actually be several

factual patterns in which the incremental harm doctrine might be
considered. One is where the harm suffered is "incremental,""" another
is where it is "identical" to the harm attributable to the nonactionable
statements,.2' and a third is where the challenged statements merely lend

alleging that an invalid notice of termination of an easement caused a delay in the sale of his real
property. See id. at 118-19. The defendant, on the other hand, contended that a challenge to the
zoning variances was the cause of the delay. See id. at 119. The court applied a substantial factor
test of causation. See id. at 120-21 (relying on Section 632 of the Restatement ISecondf of Tons).
The court described its substantial factor test, saying: ."[W]hereseveral factors combine to produce
an injury, and where any one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the
harm, a plaintiff may establish factual causation by showing that the defendant's actions.. .ware a
,substantial factor, in producing a plaintiff's injuries."' Id. at 121 (quoting Skinner v. Square D Co.,
516 N.W.2d 475,480 n.8 (Mich. 1994)). The court elaborated that "[t]he factfinder must assess tlze
relative weight of all the reasons for delay and determine whether the notice of termination was a
substantial factor in the purchaser's decision to delay the closing." Id.
258. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.. 529 F. Supp. 357,362-63 (D.
Mass. 1981) (applying Massachusetts and New York law in employing a substantial factor test.
citing Section 632 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and focusing on the "relative importance"
of the publication to potential purchasers), reird on other grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (lst Cir. 1982),
affd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
259. See Jones v.Globe Int'l, Inc., No. 3:94:CV01468, 1995 WL 819177, at 011 ID.Conn.
plaintiff has failed to prove that the
Sept. 26, 1995) (applying Connecticut law in stating that "[t]he
remaining statements caused him... further injury"); Hemphill, supra note 27, at 430.
260. Hemphill, supra note 27, at 430.
261. Judge Preska, in a scholarly opinion in the Jewell case, identified two of the variations.
See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 388 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying New
York law in recognizing the doctrine in principle, but finding it inapplicable to the instant cae).
262. See id.; see also Church of Scientology Int'l v. Time Warner, Inc.. 932 F. Supp. 589, 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying New York law in stating that where the otherwise actionable statement
merely "implies the same ultimate conclusion as that of the remainder of the publication," it is not
actionable, and referring to this rule as "[t]he subsidiary meaning doctrine"
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weight to the sting from the nonactionable portions.263 The incremental
harm doctrine appears similar to a "but for" test of causation where the
nonactionable and actionable statements were coterminous. The doctrine
might even be more onerous to plaintiffs than a "but for" test when the
effects of the otherwise actionable statement were incremental rather

than identical, since the plaintiff might be able to satisfy a "but for" test
and still lose.
Rather than sidestep the question with the incremental harm device,
the courts should analyze the causation element in a straightforward

way. They should decide whether a substantial factor test of causation is
available in the defamation equivalent of the "two fires" paradigm. A

causation analysis employing a substantial factor test seems preferable to
the incremental harm doctrine. However, one article has argued for an
exclusively "but for" test.264 That preference may, however, reflect an

incomplete view of the substantial factor alternative.2 6 Although the
substantial factor test requires that either of the "two fires" would have

alone been sufficient to produce the harm, such a finding does not
automatically satisfy the substantial factor test. Rather, the substantial
factor test, according to the Restatement, also requires an inquiry and
determination of whether the defamatory statements "ha[d] a substantial
as distinguished from a merely negligible effect in bringing about the

plaintiff's harm."

6

Thus, a substantial factor test would not

263. See Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 310 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law);
Frarmson, supra note 45, at 1484, 1500. In Herbert, a broadcast had allegedly implied that the
plaintiff had lied that he had reported war crimes in Vietnam, and therefore that the plaintiff had
been relieved of command for reasons other than the fact that he had reported war crimes. See
Herbert, 781 F.2d at 302-03, 307. The trial court refused to grant defendants summary judgment on
two statements that were not facially defamatory, but which tended to bolster the weight of the
defamatory implication that the plaintiff had not reported war crimes (and therefore had not been
relieved of command for that reason). See id. at 307. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and
held that summary judgment should have been granted on those two statements, which were merely
subsidiary to the basic implication that the plaintiff had lied about reporting war crimes, about
which the defendants had other ample grounds to support their conclusion. See id. at 312.
Essentially, the two statements bore on the broader conclusion ("subsidiary to these larger views")
that the plaintiff had lied, which was nonactionable because other grounds for making it foreclosed
a finding of the element of actual malice. See id. at 311. But Judge Kaufman refused to characterize
his rule as a variation of the incremental harm doctrine. See id. at 311 n.10.
264. See Kelley & Zansberg, supranote 45, at 13.
265. Thus, the authors seem to view the substantial factor test in narrow terms, as depending
solely on whether each of the actively operating forces would alone have been sufficient to bring
about the harm. See id. (referring to the substantial factor test as "the 'itself sufficient' exception").
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. b (1965). The Restatement identifies a
number of important considerations to be weighed in deciding whether a defendant's otherwise
actionable conduct constituted a substantial factor for the purposes of causation. They include the
number of other contributing factors and their predominance. See id. § 433(a) & cmt. d; see also
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automatically preclude a claim when the publication contained
overlapping actionable and nonactionable statements, but neither would
it find causation, unless the effect of the otherwise actionable statement
was deemed substantial enough.
Of course, one might say that a substantial factor test is really not
all that different from the incremental harm doctrine, especially an
incremental harm rule based on multiple criteria like those identified in
the Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Ihc.: case. : "' But that misses the point. By

eschewing the incremental harm doctrine in favor of a causation-based
analysis, we return to the more stable footing of the elements. In
addition, we also avoid indulging the objectionable premises underlying
the doctrine.269
3. Other Potentially Applicable Elements and Defenses
Although the proof-of-falsity and causation elements and damages
rules are the primary tools that should be considered instead of the libelproof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines, several other elements or
privileges may also occasionally overlap to varying degrees with those
doctrines. The degree of overlap is, however, difficult to gauge given the
illusive conceptual underpinnings of the libel-proof plaintiff and
incremental harm doctrines. One element that occasionally overlaps with
the two doctrines is the requirement that the defendant's statement be
one of fact rather than opinion. The Supreme Court has held, in a
related construct, that at least in matters of public concern, the
Constitution requires that the defendant's statement "be provable as
false."' The idea behind this element is basically that pure opinions

GKC Mich. Theaters, Inc. v. Grand Mall, 564 N.V.2d 117, 121 (Mich. CL App. 1997) (stating in a
slander of title case applying a substantial factor test that "[t]he factinder must assess the relative
weight of all the reasons for delay and determine whether the notice of termination was a substantial
factor in the purchaser's decision to delay the closing"), appeal denied 586 N.W.2d 924 (Mich.
1998). Professor Dobbs adds that the substantial factor test should depend to some extent on the
jury's intuition. See DOBBS, supra note 25, § 171, at 416.
267. 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
268. See supra notes 49-83 and accompanying text. Some of the commentary purporting to be
discussing the incremental harm doctrine also seems similar to a substantial factor causation
analysis without explicitly framing the matter in such terms. See Kite, supra note 27, at 558
(explaining that the incremental harm doctrine bars the claim because the "harm caused by the
nonactionable portion of the [defendant's] publication" dwarfs the harm caused by the potentially
actionable statements, rendering fine distinctions "of reputational harm required ...judicially
futile").
269. See discussion infra Part IILC.
270. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OFTORTS §§ 565-566 (1977).
271. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
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represent only the defendant's reflective processing of known facts
rather than an assertion of "new" damaging facts about the plaintiff. -'
The potential overlap of the fact element and the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine is illustrated in Kevorkian v. American Medical
Ass'n." Dr. Kevorkian brought a defamation claim based on a variety of
statements published by various people connected with the American
Medical Association, including statements to the effect that the plaintiff
"'perverts the idea of the caring and committed physician,' 'serves
merely as a reckless instrument of death,' 'poses a great threat to the
' 1' 4
public,' and engages in ['continued killings' and] 'criminal practices.'
The court held "that, with respect to the issue of assisted suicide,
plaintiff is virtually 'libel proof."'2 75 As an alternative holding, the court
added that
with respect to this highly public plaintiff and the facts of this case,
which are nothing if not matters of public concern, because the
statements also are necessarily subjective and could also be reasonably
understood as not stating actual facts, they are either nonactionable
rhetorical hyperbole or must be accorded the special solicitude
reserved for protected opinion.276

The requirement that the statement be one of fact rather than pure
opinion is sometimes also deemed to overlap with the incremental harm
doctrine. In one case, the defendant's book review had stated that the
plaintiff's book was "'sloppy journalism.' '2 77 The court said that there
were a number of observations about the plaintiff's book that could
support the sloppy-journalism appraisal, and at least five of those could
272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 565-566.
273. 602 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), appeal denied,613 N.W.2d 720 (Mich. 2000).
274. Id. at 235 (quoting a letter).
275. Id. at 239.
276. Id. The court added:
Having exercised his leadership on behalf of one side of this debate.... it is now more
than a little disingenuous for plaintiff to accuse those on the opposite side of this debate
of defamation. Such alleged defamation is grounded here in nothing more than the fact
that defendants are in disagreement with plaintiffs position: they would characterize
plaintiffs conduct differently than plaintiff would characterize it.
Id. at 240. The dissent viewed the issue exclusively in terms of whether the alleged defamatory
statements were "expressions of opinion" and thus protected. See id. (Jansen, J., dissenting). In
another case, although the court of appeals relied on the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in affirming
the Claims Commission decision, the Commission had based its decision on the fact that the
statement in question was not a factual statement. See Coker v. Sundquist, No. 01A01-9806-BC00318, 1998 WL 736655, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998). Thus, the Commission noted it "was
an exaggeration, just a piece of mockery" and anyone reading the newspaper would see that it was
"not statistically precise[]" and would not "take[] it with nit-picking precision." Id. at *2.
277. Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 312 (D.C. Cir.1994) (emphasis omitted).
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not be proven false, were reasonable interpretations, or were not
challenged.2 ' s Although the court acknowledged that the incremental
harm doctrine had already been rejected in the jurisdiction, " it
nevertheless held that the sloppy-journalism statement was not
actionable on other grounds based on the fact-opinion rule. - The court
reasoned that a book review commentary was actionable only when its
interpretations were unsupportable by reference to the written work, but
if the book review's statement is a supportable interpretation of the
author's work, then it is not actionable (because it would be opinion
rather than factual).2
The factual context in which the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is
sometimes considered may also involve the state of mind element. For
example, one case held that "[e]vidence of plaintiff's alleged past
misconduct will generally be admissible... on the issue of defendant's
malice, if the requisite foundation for such evidence is laid."' 2 The
constitutional substantive tort law complexities of the state of mind
requirement in defamation are beyond the scope of this Article. The
point here is that the state of mind element represents another doctrinal
tool for potentially limiting the scope of defamation claims, and like the
other elements, is more rationally grounded in comprehensible
defamation law than the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine.
Defendants sometimes also invoke a privilege to report official
proceedings" (or a related privilege) in addition to the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine .2 In one case, for example, although the defendant's
statement incorrectly reported that the plaintiff had been convicted of
one crime, he did have a long record of arrests and convictions

278. See id. at 320.
279. See id. at319.
280. See id. at 320.
281. See id. at 313,315.
282. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 86,93 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying New York law).
283. See RESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 611 (1977).
284. See Rogers v. Jackson Sun Newspaper, No. CIV.A.C-94-301. 1995 WL 383000, at *2
(Tenn. Cir. Ct. Jan. 30, 1995) (stating that defendant's statement vas privileged because the article
was a "substantially accurate account of [the plaintiff's] criminal record"); Finlca v. Jaeksonville
Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d 512,515 (Tex. App. 1987). Interestingly, one of the two cases relied on
by the seminal libel-proof plaintiff Cardillocase was Urbana v. Sondem, 41 F.R.D. 355. 357 D.
Conn.), afid, 370 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1966). See Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc.. 518 F.2d 638.639
(2d Cir. 1975). Although the trial court in Urbana relied on a ground similar to the libcl-lproof
plaintiff doctrine in finding that the plaintiff did not qualify under the in forma pauFeris statute, the
court of appeals also relied on two alternative grounds to support its affirmance. It held that the
action would also be precluded under the falsity element (because the statement %as substantially
true) and under the privilege to report on official proceedings. See Urbane, 370 F.2d at 14.
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extending over the last twenty-five years.' In addition to the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine and a substantial truth ground, the court of appeals
affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant on the alternative
ground that the defendant's statement was privileged. 86 The privilege in
question, a statutorily created one, was to report on judicial
proceedings.27 In applying the privilege, the court used a test based on
whether "any greater opprobrium would attach to appellant's crimes as
reported than to those crimes for which he has been convicted." '
In another case, the court's invocation of the incremental harm
doctrine seemed influenced in part by a desire to protect the privilege to
report official proceedings. In Tonnessen v. Denver Publishing Co., 89 a
newspaper was sued for reporting the in-court statements by the
plaintiff's former wife accusing him of marital rape, and reporting outof-court statements by the wife's sister to the effect that the wife had
told the sister essentially that the plaintiff had forced his wife to have sex
with him." ° Reporting the wife's accusations were privileged under the
privilege to report official proceedings.29 The court held that the report
of the sister's remarks, even if not privileged, were subject to the
incremental harm doctrine and therefore not actionable.9 The court
reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would allow [the plaintiff] to do
indirectly what he could not do directly; that is, to make [the defendantnewspaper] liable for accurately reporting the wife's in-court
statement."2 93
The preceding cases illustrate how various established elements and
defenses may overlap with both the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental
harm doctrines. Those established elements and defenses represent other
potential elemental tools with which the courts may address concerns,
similar to those that may have animated the libel-proof plaintiff and
incremental harm doctrines.

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 514.
See id. at515.
See id.
Id.
5 P.3d 959 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 962.
See id. at 964.
See id. at 966.
Id.
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C. "Unworthy Wretches"
The libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm doctrines are also
objectionable for what they represent. Viewed as discrete freestanding
constructs, separate from the elements of defamation law, it becomes
easier to see the tenuous premises on which these doctrines depend.
They are premised on a conception of an individual's nature and
reputation that is static rather than dynamic. They are also based on a
view of reputation that is monolithic rather than multifaceted. These
premises are then applied in a methodology that operates in a binary and
classificatory manner. The effects of this static and monolithic
perspective and the doctrines' operative methodology are compounded
when combined with a moral explanation for a person's classification.
The static and one-dimensional point of view inherent in the libelproof plaintiff doctrine hauntingly parallels what has been described as
the "static paradigm"' embodying American systems of poor relief:i
This static paradigm connotes a fundamental acceptance of socioeconomic stasis. 6 Some of the implications of the acceptance of the
immutability of the status quo identified by Professor Larry Catl Backer,
include "an acceptance of the existence, value, and immutability of
income inequality and its derivative notions. " With a static paradigm,
we can become comfortable with the assumption that "[tihe poor ...
make up an inevitable element of the stable social and economic
order." " Attitudes toward the poor also reflect a view of wealth as
"necessarily a function of the ability of people, by their own efforts, to
accumulate it, [so that] those who cannot or do not accumulate it in
quantity sufficient to meet their needs are labelled ...life's losers."r'
Therefore, "the desperately poor are [viewed] not like the rest of the
laboring population; they are akin to a different subspecies of
humanity."" Poverty is seen as "a pathological condition of each
individual pauper rather than a symptom of a malfunctioning society or
economic system."'1

294. Larry CatA Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Centuty America: Laking Back
Towards a General Theory of Modern American Poor Relicf. 44 CASE W. RES. L REV. 871, 877
(1995).

295. See id.
296. See id.
at 889.

297. Id.
298. Id.at 893.
299. Id. at 891.

300. Id.
301. Id. at 893.
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Similar attitudes inhere in the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. Human
beings are neatly classified, labeled, and consigned away. They are
characterized as static entities, beyond redemption, at least with respect
to the facet of their reputation under consideration. 3 ' Libel-proof

plaintiffs commonly are persons with criminal records. They frequently
are or were imprisoned. Recent reports peg the current United States

adult prison population at 1,860,520,33 "the highest in the world. ' 3 In
this country, black men and women are seventeen times more likely than

whites to have been in prison in the past year.305 Yet, as Professor Joan
Vogel reminds us, "[c]rime ...is quintessentially a cultural-not a

biological--construct."3' 6 It is convenient to classify poor and
imprisoned persons as permanently impaired goods, just like it has been
to distinguish between worthy and unworthy poor persons."° As
Professor Backer notes, "[t]he very labels society uses to 'describe' the
poor separate them from the rest of society. ' 303 The static paradigm

makes it easier "to focus on directly manipulating the target population
rather than attempting the manipulation of the system."' "' That way the

targeted population is contained. With the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine,
the legal options of the unworthy members of the society are similarly

contained.
By perceiving the distress of poor and imprisoned persons as a
moral matter, we not only confine them "to a purgatory of personal

failure and [make] them mere outcasts of society,

3'0

but decision makers

31

thereby can more comfortably avoid ' acknowledging any societal
302. See Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New
York law). The court held that with respect to the statement that the plaintiff "'is married and also
has a live-in girlfriend, Kathy Keeton,"' id. at 299 (quoting a 1983 issue of Penthouse), the
plaintiff's "reputation regarding adultery rendered him libel-proof on this subject." Id. at 303-04.
The court added, "[nior is it tenable to maintain that [the plaintiff], though libel-proof as to adultery
from 1966 to 1979, somehow succeeded in restoring his reputation during the four years prior to the
Hustler statement." Id. at 304.
303. See Jerry Seper, Prison Population in U.S. Expected to Top 2 Million, WASH. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2000, at A4.
304. Id.
305. See id.
306. Vogel, supra note 14, at 426.
307. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF
POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM INAMERICA 37 (1991) (stating that "the evolution of welfare policy
is, in large part, the process of creating and revising the moral classifications of the poor").
308. Backer, supra note 294, at 891.
309. Id. at 983-84.
310. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA

77 (2d ed. 1979).

311. See Wes Daniels, "Derelicts," Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and Lifestle
Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal Advocates, 45 BuFm. L.
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responsibility. They need not address other explanations for the current
plight of such individuals, such as centuries of pervasive racism, modem
urban apartheid, and gender, class, and race-based exploitation.

Throughout American "social history, racial discrimination and nativism
have served to affirm dominant values, status, and power by defining
people of color and immigrants as deviant and degraded. '' 2

Social Darwvinism

provided the most obvious philosophical prop

for classificatory doctrines like the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine,

although no court has expressly acknowledged the connection. Herbert
Spencer, the quintessential Social Darwinist who coined the "survival of
the fittest ' 1 4 phrase, provided much of the intellectual fodder paving the
way for rules like the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. One and a half
centuries ago Spencer tells us:
A civilized society is made unlike a barbarous one by the
establishment of regulative classes-governmental, administrative,
military, ecclesiastical, legal, ... which ... are also held together as a
general class by a certain community of privileges, of blood, of
education, of intercourse. In some societies, fully developed after their
particular types, this consolidation into castes, and this union among
the upper castes by separation from the lower, eventually grow very
decided: to be afterwards rendered less decided, only in cases of social
metamorphosis caused by the industrial regime. 5

Just as Social Darwinism rationalizes preservation of the economic
status quo,316 so does it rationalize recognition

of a libel-proof

classification. It has never made sense to me, however, how an

evolutionary theory, premised as it is, on change and development, could

REv. 687, 688 (1997) (stating that "as scholars have noted in a variety of areas. legal doctrine is
structured in such a way as to effectively erase struggle").
312. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 307, at 26.
313. See generally RicHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCiAL DARVWNiSM IN AMERICAN TiouGtrr(rev.
ed. 1955) (describing the impact of Charles Darwin's theories of biological evolution on intellectual
life and social thought).
314. 1 HERBERT SPENcER, THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY § 165. at 444. § 167, at 457 (189Sp.
315. HERBERT SPENCER, FIRST PRINCIPLES § 111, at 317 (4th ed. 1896, largely based on 2d ed.
1867). He adds that "[glradually, as the tribe progresses, the contrast between the governing and the
governed grows more decided." Id. § 122, at 343. On Spencer's influence, Hofstadter notes: -If
Spencer's abiding impact on American thought seems impalpable to later generations, it is Pzrhaps
only because it has been so thoroughly absorbed." HoMs'rT'R. supra note 313. at 50.
316. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 313, at 7 (referring to Social Darwinism as defending the
status quo and strengthening "almost all efforts at the conscious and directed change of societf":
Vogel, supra note 14, at 427 (noting that "la]ny sort of political and social reform that tried to
improve the conditions for the lower classes would only interfere with the workings of natural
selection").
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be so unabashedly urged as justification for preserving the status quo.
Biological evolutionary notions founded on dynamic change and
development do not seem well-suited premises on which to hang a rule
of law that depends on individuals in a permanently suspended stage of
character development. In truth, then, the "survival of the fittest"
epigram provided more of an emotional than a logical foundation to
support the preservation of the status quo and social stasis. The
unworthy poor person, the incorrigible criminal, and the libel-proof
classifications become effortless guilt-free next steps317once fixed socioeconomic strata were viewed simply as nature's way.
In his oral history of homeless Americans, Steven VanderStaay
relates the story of a twenty-eight-year-old homeless person.3 " He quotes
her: "I'm Hell; that's my name. My mother called me that. ' ' 319 She
explained: "My mom had emotional problems, some type of mental
disability, and drug addiction and alcoholism on top of it. And
everything that went
wrong in her love life, or home life, or anything
32
fault.
my
was
else,
Would a homeless street person who has been to prison, who
panhandles, who has had two children, and who has been known for
twenty-eight years as "Hell," be deemed libel-proof? Is that where we
are headed with this?
The static libel-proof plaintiff classification conflicts with bedrock
spiritual values of redemption and dynamic human resilience. As J. R.
Lucas has noted:
If God created man in His own image, He must have created him
capable of new initiatives and new insights which cannot be precisely
or infallibly foreknown, but which give to the future a perpetual
freshness as the inexhaustible variety of possible thoughts and actions,
on the part
of His children as well as Himself, crystallizes into
321
actuality.

317. The poor, according to Spencer, were unfit for aid and should be winnowed out. See
HOFSTADTER, supra note 313, at 41.
318. See STEVEN VANDERSTAAY,

STREET LIVES: AN ORAL HISTORY OF HOMELESS

AMERICANS 72 (1992).
319. Id. at 73.
320. Id. at 72.
321. LUCAS, supra note 16, at 233.
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THE "GORDIAN KNOT" SYNDROME

It is hard to imagine that judges, who have learned to distrust human
classifications, could ever feel comfortable deciding who is or is not so
characteristically unworthy as to be deemed libel-proof.2
IV.

CONCLUSION

I believe that the libel-proof plaintiff and incremental harm
doctrines should be rejected by the courts. I base this conclusion on two
objections to the doctrines. First, on an instrumental level, I oppose the
doctrines because they bypass the elements, privileges, and damages
rules of defamation law, or at least operate independently of those
established elemental principles. Far from rationalizing and streamlining
the litigation process, the doctrines add uncertainty and complexity to
defamation law. Many cases ostensibly relying on the libel-proof
plaintiff or incremental harm doctrines can be (and often, through
alternative holdings, have been) better analyzed within the framework of
the elements, privileges, and damages rules, without the need to invoke
the libel-proof or incremental harm doctrines. Defamation claims should
be determined exclusively within the framework of the elements,
privileges-defenses, and damages rules of defamation law. If those
foundational components are in need of change, then that process should
occur directly and thoughtfully, rather than obliquely through doctrinal
expedients.
Secondly, the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and to some extent the
incremental harm doctrine are based on faulty premises. The doctrines
depend on a view of an individual's nature and reputation that is static
rather than dynamic. They are also premised on a view of reputation that
is monolithic rather than multifaceted. The doctrines are binary and
classificatory in their methodology and operation. This classificatory
approach is emblematic of a broader tendency to use "unworthiness"
classifications as easy solvents for complex social problems, masking
and thereby avoiding the felt need to grapple with the underlying causes.
Classifying persons as libel-proof, or criminals, or unworthy poor, neatly
dismisses their claims and their predicaments. And we are no closer to
real solutions for untying the gnarled coils that have ensnared so many
for so long. The doctrines also place our judges in a position they have
usually assiduously avoided-that of deciding who is and who is not

322. See Daly, supra note 42, at 392 (saying that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine would
require the judge to make a determination he "would be extremely uncomfortable with, akin to

making plaintiffs wear a scarlet 'L-P' on their chest").
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characteristically worthy of legal respect and protection from defamatory
attack.
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